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VR Acquisitions, LLC (“VRA”) respectfully submits this Supplemental Brief in
response to the questions the Court posed in its March 10, 2017 Supplemental Briefing
Order.
INTRODUCTION
The questions posed by the Court are difficult, undecided in Utah law and, in
many respects, unanswered anywhere. At the end of the day, however, the only question
the Court must answer is whether the Legislature, in passage of the Public Waters Access
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-29-101, et seq. (“the “Act”), acted contrary to the
Constitution. It did not; it acted consistent with its trust obligations.
In considering the issues before the court, it is crucial to recognize that the
easement defined in Conatser v. Johnson is “corollary” to the public ownership of water
conceived of under the common law and later codified. It does not derive from the
Constitution. It does not derive from an ownership interest in land.
A truism often repeated by legal scholars and courts, water is a scarce and
essential resource in the west. Water is necessary to make the desert bloom both literally,
through irrigation, and figuratively, through industry and lifestyle. It is for this reason that
water enjoys different treatment under the law than land – something the west has in
abundance. Water, unlike land, is not subject to ownership by any individual or the State.
Title to water cannot be acquired or transferred. For these very basic reasons, water –
and the easement corollary to it – are not and cannot be subject to article XX, section 1 of
the Utah Constitution, the only basis on which the district court invalidated the Act. The
Court need not go any further as, barring a constitutional restraint, there is no basis on
which to undo the Legislature’s passage of the Act.

1
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This is not to say that the State does not hold the water in trust for the public. To
do so would be to contradict any number of judicial pronouncements to the contrary.
Such trust devolves not from the Constitution, however, but from the common law and
does not provide a basis on which to set aside legislative action. The Court need not
wade into these murky waters because the State, in passage of the Act, comported with its
trust obligations.
Inherent in the concept of the public trust is the acknowledgment that the most
necessary and beneficial uses of water will change over time. As evidenced through the
evolution of the law governing appropriation, the uses in our state have changed since the
pioneers arrived in 1847. As society evolved, so too did the public’s use of water. Utahns
originally used their water for irrigation, mining, and domestic uses. Later, the law
recognized the need to provide for hydroelectric power and, even more recently,
recreational purposes. Not all uses, however, can co-exist with the same integrity. Water
is a finite resource. Provision for one use necessarily diminishes the availability for
others. It requires a value judgment. It gives rise to dispute: irrigators versus miners;
energy providers versus recreators; rafters versus anglers; bait anglers versus fly anglers.
The common law and, eventually, the framers of the Constitution provided that
these disputes were to be resolved by the Legislature as the elected representatives of the
public. It is the Legislature that can change, and has changed, policy according to the
evolution of science, industry, and society. The Legislature, as the governing body, is not
required to promote one use over another. It is required – if anything – to assure that
water can be put to any necessary and beneficial use that now is needed or might be
warranted in the future. This is the scope of the State’s trust obligation: assuring that a
future legislature can reach a different result. As long as the State does not take action

2
1274429.2

that deprives it from acting in what it deems to be appropriate in light of the needs of the
people at any time, it has complied with its obligations.
In management of the water, the Legislature is afforded wide discretion. It is in the
best position to manage the needs and uses of the people. Unlike a court decision
enshrining protection for one particular use in the Constitution, the Legislature can weigh
and prioritize competing uses according to its assessment of the needs and wants of the
electorate. But the Legislature does not undertake this task without restriction.
As in all matters, the Legislature is bound by the limits imposed on it by the
Constitution. These include equal protection and due process, among others. The
Legislature is also bound to protect other express rights afforded by the Constitution such
as the prohibition against an uncompensated taking of private property and its general
obligation to promote public welfare. Barring action that implicates a fundamental right
or a protected class, the court’s oversight is minimal, examining legislative action for a
rational relationship to a public purpose.
The court’s decision in Conatser flowed from statute that codified common law
public ownership of water and the legislative recognition of the value of recreational use
of the waters. The Conatser decision, however, also brought into question the integrity of
private property underlying non-navigable streams and created discord between
recreators and landowners. The Legislature, thus, acted to assure landowners’ right to
exclude and to reduce conflict between competing factions of the public, both of which
claimed protection under the Constitution. The Legislature did not, however, deprive a
future legislature from coming to a different conclusion and expanding the rights of
recreators so long as it can do so without impinging on any other protected right. Perhaps
the Legislature made a mistake and misread the desires of the people. This happens. And
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when it does, it is the responsibility of the people to elect representatives that will act
more in accordance with their desires.
The Court’s role is not that or arbiter of competing uses of the water; it is limited
to assuring that the Legislature acts in accordance with the restrictions imposed on it by
the Constitution. Here, the Legislature adhered to its mandate. It did not dispose of any
interest in land protected by article XX or otherwise clearly and unequivocally violate
any other provision of the Constitution. It acted in a manner with which some disagree.
This, however, is not a basis on which to embed the common law public trust doctrine or
particular uses into the Constitution and invalidate the Act.
For the reasons set forth herein and in the prior briefing submitted by VRA and the
State in the above-captioned matter, VRA respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
district court and direct entry of judgment in favor of VRA and the State.

4
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ARGUMENT
1.

The public access rights articulated in J.J.N.P.1 and Conatser2 are not “lands
of the State” that have been “acquired” under article XX, Section 1.3
In its ultimate conclusion in this matter, the trial court held that the passage of the

Act violated the state public trust doctrine purportedly embedded in article XX, Section 1
of the Utah Constitution. It did so based on at least two faulty premises: (1) the easement
announced fully in Conatser constitutes an interest in “land” which was “acquired” by
the State; and, (2) the Act effectively “disposed” of that easement in a manner that
substantially impairs the public’s interest in the lands and waters remaining. But what the
Court has termed the “public access right” to touch privately-owned streambeds attendant
to use of the water articulated by J.J.N.P. and, later, Conatser, is not an interest in “land”
that was “acquired” subject to article XX or any public trust obligation embedded
therein.4
1

References to “J.J.N.P.” throughout this brief refer to J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, By &
Through Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982).
2
References to “Conatser” throughout this brief refer to Conatser v. Johnson 194 P.3d
897 (Utah 2008).
3
The question posed by the court presupposes that the public trust doctrine is based in
article XX, section 1. VRA disagrees with this assumption. The public trust doctrine is a
common law doctrine, not a constitutional mandate. See Robin Kundis Craig, A
Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private
Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 Ecology L.Q. 53, 58
(2010) (“Public trust law, in other words, is very much a species of state common law”);
see also Kootenai Envtl. All., Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 625, 671
P.2d 1085, 1088 (1983); Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., 443 N.J. Super. 293, 304, 128 A.3d 749, 756 (App. Div. 2015); James L. Huffman,
Why Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine Is Bad for the Public, 45. ENVTL. L. 337
(Spring 2015). In any event, VRA submits that the court need not reach this question
because the Act did not dispose of any public trust resource and thus does not pass the
threshold test to implicate either article XX or any common law public trust doctrine.
4
While the Court has posed the question in terms of “public access” rights, neither
J.J.N.P. nor Conatser authorized the public to traverse private property to gain access to
waters in the State. Rather, each addressed use of the water for recreation purposes and
5
1274429.2

As explained more fully in section 1.B, below, in the western United States there
exists a necessary and fundamental difference between the “water” and “lands.” This
principle predates Utah’s statehood, was implicitly and explicitly recognized as Utah
acceded as a state of the Union, and persists to this day. “Waters” are not “lands.”
Moreover, and as explained in section 1.C, below, by statute, the “public”, and not the
“State”, collectively owns the waters. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1. The State holds, but
does not own, the waters. The State, never having “acquired” the waters in the State also
never “acquired” the corollary easement for recreational use articulated in J.J.N.P. and
Conatser. Article XX does not apply.
A.

The “rights” recognized in Conatser and J.J.N.P. arise out of statute,
legislative policy, and common law.

That the waters in the State have long been utilized for recreation by the public
does not mean, of course, that the public always had a “right” to touch the privatelyowned beds of non-navigable streams while doing so.5 Both J.J.N.P. and Conatser
recognized of a public “easement” for use of waters that is “corollary” to public
ownership of the corpus of the water, an easement that extended to permit the touching of
private property underlying the waters while recreating. J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136;
Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ¶ 8. Though these “rights” did not materialize from thin air,
neither were they rooted in the Utah Constitution. See Brief of Appellant VR
Acquisitions, LLC (“VRA App. Br.”) at 16–25; Reply Brief of Appellant VR
Acquisitions, LLC (“VRA Rep. Br.”) at 11–17). Rather, they find their origins in the

Conatser extended the recreational easement described in J.J.N.P. to touch the privatelyowned beds of streams while engaged in recreation.
5
In fact, the trial court concluded that such was not the practice before Conatser. (R.
2620).
6
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interpretation of statute reflecting common law principles and application of legislativelydetermined policy.
Utah law – statutory, constitution, and common – makes no mention of any “right”
to recreate using the waters of the State for nearly the first 100 years of Utah’s statehood
and for nearly 90 years after the codification of public ownership of the waters.6 This
absence of any pronounced “right” to recreate does not derive from any want for anglers
or rafters in the State. Rather, the absence was a result of the value judgments of the
State acting as trustee over the corpus of the waters in the State. The Utah Legislature, the
branch of government charged with regulating the use of the waters for the benefit of the
public, did not, until the late 1970s, officially recognize recreation as a public use to be
considered in regulation of the waters in the State.
As the court explained in Little v. Greene & Weed Inv., 839 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah
1992) (emphasis added):
Since 1888, the right to use water in Utah has been governed by statute.
See Compiled Laws of Utah 1888, vol. 2, ch. 2. Early statutes provided
that water rights became vested upon appropriation to a beneficial use. Id.
§ 2870; Revised Statutes of Utah 1898, tit. 33, §§ 1261-62; Bishop v. Duck
Creek Irrigation Co., 121 Utah 290, 293, 241 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1952). In
1903, the Legislature codified the application and certification procedures
for the acquisition of water rights, but preserved the rights acquired through
earlier appropriations. See 1903 Utah Laws ch. 100, §§ 35-45, 72;
Compiled Laws of Utah 1907 tit. 40. The Legislature also for the first time
declared all natural waters of the state to be public property. 1903 Utah
Laws ch. 100, §47; Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (1989).
It is the Legislature’s statutory declaration of public ownership and the subsequent
legislative recognition of the relative value of recreational uses of the water that provided
6

As described in prior briefing, the “right” to recreate was absent from common law
jurisprudence at the time of Utah’s statehood. See VRA Rep. Br. at 11–17.
7
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the basis for the court’s first acknowledgment of a recreational easement for use of the
waters of the State in 1982.
By statute and according to the intent of the framers of Utah’s Constitution, the
State Engineer is and has long been tasked with considering appropriation applications
with an eye toward whether there are other, “more beneficial” uses that might be made of
the water. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-8, -29. The universe of “more beneficial”
uses has, over the course of Utah’s history, been determined by the Legislature. Before
1971, the State Engineer was required to reject any application “where the approval of
such application would in the opinion of the State Engineer interfere with the more
beneficial use for irrigation, domestic or culinary purposes, stock watering, power or
mining development, manufacturing, or would prove detrimental to the public welfare
….” R.S.U. § 100-3-8. Notably absent from this litany of beneficial uses is any reference
to recreation. This changed in 1971 when the Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 733-8 to provide that in evaluating applications for appropriation, the State Engineer was to
consider recreational uses of the water, as well. In particular, in 1971, Utah Code Ann.
§ 73-3-8, the current iteration of R.S.U. § 100-3-8, was amended to state:
If the state engineer … has reason to believe that an application will
interfere with the water's more beneficial use for irrigation, municipal and
industrial, domestic or culinary, stock watering, power or mining
development, or manufacturing, or will unreasonably affect public
recreation or the natural stream environment, or will prove detrimental to
the public welfare, the state engineer shall withhold approval or rejection of
the application until the state engineer has investigated the matter.
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 (emphasis added). Section 73-3-29, also amended to include
recreation in 1971, provided that with respect to relocation of streams, the State Engineer
should consider whether the proposed “change … will unreasonably affect any
recreational use….” Utah Code § 73-3-29 (1971). The Legislature made no such mention
8
1274429.2

of recreation when declaring public ownership in 1903; nor did it make any mention of
recreation in the 1953 version of section 73-3-8.
Given that the basis for public ownership of water as well as the recognition of
recreational uses of water are both rooted in statute, not surprisingly the courts in both
Conatser and J.J.N.P. based their holdings on the statutory declaration of public
ownership and, as previously briefed, directly tie that principle to the then-current version
of section 73-1-1 or its 1903 predecessor. See VRA App. Br. at 17; see also Parks v.
Cooper, 676 N.W. 2d 823, 840 (S. Dak. 2004) (characterizing J.J.N.P. as an exercise in
statutory interpretation). Specifically and in recognition of its common law roots, J.J.N.P.
referred to section 73-1-1 as “the doctrine of public ownership.” J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at
1136.
Then, acknowledging and applying the Legislature’s recognition of recreational
uses and ecological concerns, the J.J.N.P. court wrote:
A corollary of the proposition that the public owns the water is the rule that
there is a public easement over the water regardless of who owns the water
beds beneath the water. . . . Furthermore, state policy recognizes an interest
of the public in the use of state waters for recreational purposes by
requiring that recreational uses be considered by the State Engineer before
he approves an application for appropriation, § 73–3–8, or permits the
relocation of a stream, § 73–3–29.
Id. (emphasis added). The J.J.N.P. court referred specifically to Utah code sections 73-38 and 73-3-29, both of which legislatively recognized public recreational interests in the
waters in the State. The J.J.N.P. court did not cite the Constitution for the doctrine of
public ownership of waters in the State or even the common law. It referred to statute. 7
7

As described at length in prior briefing, and not repeated here, the framers of the Utah
Constitution expressly rejected the opportunity to constitutionalize public ownership of
the waters in the State in favor of delegating responsibility of managing water uses to the
Legislature. See VRA App. Br. at 22-25.
9
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Id. The court in Conatser then adopted and applied this statutory basis of the easement,
extending it to permit the public to touch privately-owned streambeds while recreating
using the waters in the State. Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ¶¶ 22-25. Conatser characterized
J.J.N.P. as having “established our own rule” enabling recreation utilizing the waters of
the State irrespective of the ownership of the beds beneath. Id. at ¶ 19.
The courts in J.J.N.P. and Conatser both acknowledged and relied on section 731-1 and its proclamation of public ownership of waters in the State. And both courts
engaged in statutory interpretation to determine whether such public ownership included
a right to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams while recreating in
light of the Legislature’s identification of recreation as a valid and potentially beneficial
use of the waters in the State. The “rights” set forth in Conatser and J.J.N.P. stem from
the statutory recognition of public ownership of waters in the State.
B.

The rights recognized in Conatser and J.J.N.P. are not “lands” within
the scope of article XX, section 1.

Article XX, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides, in part:
[A]ll lands acquired by gift, grant or devise… or that may otherwise be
acquired, are hereby accepted, and … are declared to be the public lands of
the State; and shall be held in trust for the people to be disposed of as may
be provided by law, for the respective purposes for which they have been or
may be granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired.
The plain language of this provision makes clear that it applies only to “lands.” The
easement recognized in Conatser and J.J.N.P. as a corollary of public ownership of the
water does not meet this very basic requirement for application of article XX. 8 Waters
are not lands.
8

This issue was first raised in cross-motions for summary judgment in which VRA
argued, among other things, that article XX did not apply because the Conatser easement
did not constitute “lands acquired by the State.” (R. 0411; 0703). The district court
10
1274429.2

In 1848, the United States government acquired control of the lands that would
become the state of Utah from Mexico pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. In
the years that followed, as the west was settled, the United States government recognized
the customary separation of land and waters in the region and sanctioned a system of
prior appropriation to govern use of water in the west rather than the system of riparian
rights that had predominated throughout the development of the common law.
The distinction between water and land was evident in the Mining Act of 1866 as well as
the Desert Lands Act of 1877, as was explained and confirmed by the United States
Supreme Court in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Company,
295 U.S. 142 (1935), authored by Justice Sutherland, a Utah native. In California Oregon
Power, the Court addressed the question of whether property acquired prior to passage of
a system of appropriated rights in the Oregon Water Code of 1909 included associated
riparian rights. The Court concluded that it did not. And in reaching this conclusion, the
Court traced the history of water in the west and made clear the distinction between
“land” and “water.” California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. at 160–65.
In passage of the Mining Act of 1866, the United States Congress implicitly
sanctioned the custom of the west in affording rights to the use of waters for mining and
other beneficial uses according to local rules, including the recognition of rights of the
first appropriator. California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. at 154–155. The Mining Act
provided:
Whenever by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining,
agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued,
concluded that the easement was an interest in land subject to article XX, but that article
XX was not implicated due to the absence of a “disposition.” (R. 0763). The district court
subsequently revised this conclusion. (R. 2659–60; 4854; 4870).
11
1274429.2

and the same are recognized by local customs, laws, and the decisions of
courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained
and protected in the same.
Id. (citation omitted).
The Desert Lands Act of 1877, allowing for the entry and reclamation of desert
lands within western States and Territories (including Utah), made a more “positive
declaration.” Id. Specifically, it recognized prior appropriated rights and provided:
All surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use,
together with the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources of water
supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held
free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and
manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights.
Id. at 156 (quoting Desert Lands Act, c. 107, s 1, 19 Stat. 377 (43 U.S.C.A. §321)).
The Supreme Court interpreted this statute as severing the land from the water:
“The fair construction of the provision now under review is that Congress intended to
establish the rule that for the future the land should be patented separately; and that all
nonnavigable waters thereon should be reserved for the use of the public under the laws
of the states and territories named.” Id. at 162. The Court continued that the terms of this
statute:
must be read into every patent thereafter issued, with the same force as
though expressly incorporated therein, with the result that the grantee will
take the legal title to the land conveyed, and such title, and only such title,
to the flowing waters thereon as shall be fixed or acknowledged by the
customs, laws, and judicial decisions of the state of their location.
Id. at 162. In short, as of 1877, lands of the Western United States were patented as
estates separate and distinct from the waters that flowed over them. And it was under this
rubric that Utah became a state.
The framers of the Utah Constitution, consistent with the Desert Lands Act,
treated water and lands separately. The question of waters was addressed in the debate
12
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surrounding article XVII. In the course of such debate, the framers made clear the
protection for prior appropriated rights and declined the opportunity to assert ownership
of the waters in the State. (VRA App. Br. at 24–25). The question of lands was addressed
in the debate surrounding article XX. In particular, the framers’ discussion focused on
compliance with the terms of the Enabling Act passed by the United States Congress in
1894 and its specific grants of land for particular purposes. See, e.g., Utah Enabling Act,
ch. 138, §§ 6–8, 12, 28 Stat. 107 (1894); Const. Conv. Proceedings, April 8, 1895 at 808–
809; April 9, 1895 at 813–815; April 19, 1895 at 1206–07; April 30, 1895 at 1686–1703.
The framers could have dealt with “lands” and “waters” as one. But instead they
maintained the distinction between title to land and rights to the use of water. And this
division remains today in Utah law through regulation of water on the basis of
appropriation rather than title to underlying lands. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-1 et seq.
To conclude that public ownership of the corpus of the water – the foundation for
the Conatser easement – is the same as “lands” acquired by the State, is to disregard the
distinction between those concepts that has been inherent in the laws since prior to
statehood. In the west, acquisition of “lands” does not include any corresponding
acquisition of “water.” Article XX, by virtue of its plain language as well as the
expressed views of the framers, is inapplicable to any easement right attached to the
“waters” in the State.
C.

The rights recognized in J.J.N.P. and Conatser were not “acquired” by
the State.

Article XX of the Utah Constitution applies only to lands “acquired” by the
“State.” As discussed in section 1.A, the recreational easement articulated by J.J.N.P.
and Conatser derives not from “land” ownership but as a corollary to public ownership of
the waters. This concept of public ownership does not mean, however, that the corpus of
13
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the water has been acquired by the State. The public, collectively, owns the waters; not
the State. Having never “acquired” the waters, the State also never “acquired” the
corollary easement for recreational use recognized in J.J.N.P. and Conatser.
The question of ownership of the corpus of the waters in the state of Utah was
addressed in Adams v. Portage Irr., Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 653 (Utah
1937). In describing the distinction between public and private waters, the court wrote of
public (i.e., unappropriated) waters: “[t]he title thereto is in the public; all are equal
owners; that is, have coequal rights therein, and one cannot obtain exclusive control
thereof.” Id. at 652. This, however, is distinct from the interest of the State. Again
describing unappropriated waters, the court wrote:
The title thereto is not subject to private acquisition and barter, even by
the federal government or the state itself. In the interests of order in the
social and economic set, rights to the use thereof may be granted to bodies
or individuals as provided by law, but no title to the corpus of the water
itself has been or can be granted, while it is naturally flowing, any more
than it can to the air or the winds or the sunshine.
Id. at 652–53 (emphasis added). Put another way, the State can neither acquire nor
dispose of title to the waters in the state. “Water flowing in a natural stream or in a ditch
is not subject to ownership, so far as the corpus of the water is concerned.” Bear Lake &
River Waterworks & Irrigation Co. v. Ogden City, 8 Utah 494, 33 P. 135, 136 (1893).
Utah precedent is clear – no man and no state own the water. This concept is not new;
rather, it is derived from common law and was embraced by the framers of the Utah
constitution.
This common law concept of public ownership dates back to Roman law,
meandered into English law, and then charted a course to America: “‘[b]y the law of
nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea and
consequently the shores of the sea.’” Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d
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419, 433–34, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (1983) (quoting Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1)). “From
this origin in Roman law, the English common law evolved the concept of the public
trust, under which the sovereign owns ‘all of its navigable waterways and the lands lying
beneath them ‘as trustee of a public trust for the benefit of the people.’” Nat'l Audubon
Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 453 (internal quotations omitted).
By the common law, both the title and the dominion of the sea, and of rivers and
arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all the lands below highwater mark, within the jurisdiction of the crown of England, are in the king. Such
waters, and the lands which they cover, either at all times, or at least when the tide
is in, are incapable of ordinary and private occupation, cultivation, and
improvement; and their natural and primary uses are public in their nature, for
highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose
of fishing by all the king's subjects. Therefore the title, jus privatum, in such lands,
as of waste and unoccupied lands, belongs to the king, as the sovereign; and the
dominion thereof, jus publicum, is vested in him, as the representative of the
nation and for the public benefit.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894). In a similar vein, during “the eleventh and
twelfth centuries, English villages were largely feudal and had “common” land for
grazing livestock.” Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the
Attorney General As the Guardian of the State's Natural Resources, 16 Duke Envtl. L. &
Pol'y F. 57, 64 (2005). This concept is, again, consistent with the treatment of water by
the framers of the Utah Constitution.
As discussed in prior briefing, debate on article XVII of the Constitution focused
on assuring that prior appropriated rights were confirmed. See VRA App. Br. at 24-25.
In the end, the framers rejected a version of article XVII that declared water to be the
property of the state; not even the framers understood the state to have acquired the
corpus of the water. Id. Ultimately, article XVII was limited to confirming existing rights
to use of waters “in the State….” Utah Const. art. XVII.
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The use of the preposition “in” as opposed to “of” is notable. It signifies that the
provision pertains to the geographic location of water as opposed to the ownership of
such water by the State. This distinction remains today with the current version of Utah
Code Ann. § 73-1-1: “All waters in this state… are hereby declared to be the property of
the public….”
The United States government did not have authority to convey ownership of
water to the state of Utah. And the Enabling Act made no attempt to do so. See Utah
Enabling Act, ch. 138, passim, 28 Stat. 107 (1894). Displaying an understanding of this
limitation, Utah law likewise does not make any claim of State ownership of the waters in
Utah; rather it recognizes “public” ownership. Because Utah has not acquired title to the
waters in the State, article XX has no application to the corpus of the water in the State or
to an easement corollary to ownership of the corpus of that water.
2.

If the Conatser rights qualify as “lands of the State” that have been
“acquired” by the State, the appropriate standard of scrutiny to apply to the
Act is rational basis.
As held by the United States Supreme Court, “following the [Desert Lands] Act of

1877, if not before, all nonnavigable waters then a part of the public domain became
publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated states, including those since
created out of the territories named…” California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. at 163–64
(emphasis added). It is through this lens of the State’s plenary authority that the level of
scrutiny to be applied to State regulation of waters must be considered. While VRA
contests the premise that the rights described in Conatser constitute lands of the State
acquired by the State, thereby subjecting them to article XX, if this were the case, the
passage of the Act must be examined under a rational basis standard. Lee v. Gaufin, 867
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P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993); Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 105
(1899).
Utah law provides no apparent guidance as to the level of scrutiny applied to
challenges asserted under article XX of the Utah Constitution. The Court must therefore
look for guidance to both the scope of the Legislature’s authority to regulate the waters in
the State and standards applied thereto under alternative constitutional restrictions. Each
of these tributaries leads to the conclusion that the Act, should it apply to “lands”
acquired by the State, must be examined only for a rational basis.
When determining the constitutionality of a statute in the face of a challenge under
the uniform operation of laws or equal protection provision, the court considers “(1) what
classifications the statute creates; (2) whether different classes ... are treated disparately;
and (3) if there is disparate treatment between classes, whether the legislature had any
reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.” State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ¶ 21, 245
P.3d 745, 752 (citing State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ¶ 12, 63 P.3d 667) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “On the third point, there are two possible levels of scrutiny—
each involving a three-part analysis.” Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ¶ 21 (citing State v. Drej, 2010
UT 35, ¶ 34, 233 P.3d 476). If “a legislative enactment implicates a fundamental or
critical right or creates classifications which are considered impermissible or suspect in
the abstract, [the court] appl[ies] a heightened degree of scrutiny.” Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ¶
21 (quoting Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 40, 54 P.3d 1069 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Otherwise, the court “employ[s] a rational basis review that involves
determining (1) whether the classification is reasonable; (2) whether the objectives of the
legislative action are legitimate, and (3) whether there is a reasonable relationship

17
1274429.2

between the classification and the legislative purpose.” Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ¶ 21, 245
(internal citations omitted).
Likewise, determining the constitutionality of a statute in the face of a challenge
based on “substantive due process analysis under both article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, this court
applies a rational basis test unless the governmental action implicates a fundamental right
or interest.” Id. at ¶ 10 (citing State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ¶ 16, 232 P.3d 1008). That
is, under the due process clause, a statute that does not infringe a fundamental right is
subject only to rational basis review and will be upheld if it has “‘a reasonable relation to
a proper legislative purpose, and [is] neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.’” Tindley v.
Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 2005 UT 30, ¶ 29, 116 P.3d 295, 303 holding modified by Moss
v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Comm'n, 2007 UT 99, ¶ 29, 175 P.3d 1042.
On the level of scrutiny to be applied to regulation of waters in the state, J.J.N.P.
educates. The court in J.J.N.P. addressed an equal protection challenge to a statute
prohibiting the operation of a private fish installation on natural waters and the denial of a
permit to establish a private fish installation. In so doing, like here, the court was asked to
assess the propriety of legislation governing the use of natural resources. The court wrote
that “[a] presumption of constitutionality is extended to statutes …. And that presumption
is sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of a classification created by statute unless the
classification creates an invidious distinction or bears no rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose.” J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1138. And, in fact, the “presumption
requires a court to presume that the classification was intended to further the legislative
purpose.” Lee, 867 P.2d at 580. The United States Supreme Court applied the same
standard in a challenge to a California statute that limited the vote for the board of
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directors of a water storage district to landowners. Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719, 734 (1973).
Though no equal protection challenge has been brought in this litigation, the
general tenets of rational basis review apply. The Act passes muster under this standard.
In Utah Code section 73-29-103, the Legislature announced a number of legitimate state
purposes for the Act, including the protection of private property rights under article I,
section 22 of the Constitution and restoring the harmony between recreators and
landowners that existed before Conatser. The Legislature declared:
“(3) whether, or to what extent, a public easement exists for recreational
use of public waters on private property is uncertain after judicial decisions
in the cases of J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982) and
Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897 (Utah 2008), which decisions did not
address the constitutional prohibition on taking or damaging private
property without just compensation; [and]
…
(6) its intent to foster restoration of the accommodation existing between
recreational users and private property owners before the decision in
Conatser v. Johnson, affirm a floating right recognized by the court in
J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, and recognize adverse use as a constitutionally sound
and manageable basis for establishing a limited right of public recreational
access on private property in accordance with this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-29-103 (3) & (6). Fostering harmony between recreators and
landowners and protection of constitutional rights epitomizes the Legislature’s duty to
balance competing interests and serves as legitimate state purpose sufficient to sustain the
Act. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Utah Alliance to Protect Property Rights at 6–8.
A.

The district court properly considered whether the Act substantially
impaired the public’s interest in the lands and waters remaining.

The district court concluded that examination of whether the Act violated article
XX of the Utah Constitution required consideration of whether the Act substantially
19
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impaired the public’s interest in the lands and waters remaining. (R. 1114–15; 2609). In
so doing, the court applied the well-established rule of Illinois Central deemed
“controlling” by the Court in Colman v. State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 635 (Utah 1990).
Although VRA contends that the district court should never have reached the question of
substantial impairment9 and although VRA takes issue with the test the district court
created and its application of that test via article XX, to the extent it was correct in doing
so, the district court did not err in considering substantial impairment in conjunction with
applying the common law public trust doctrine, whether grafted on to article XX or
otherwise.10 This is clear from the evolution of the district court’s reasoning during the
course of litigation and application of Utah precedent authorizing disposition that does
not result in substantial impairment.
In its first memorandum decision, the district court grappled with a number of
issues including (1) whether the Act violated article XX of the Utah Constitution; and (2)
whether the Act violated what the court termed the “federal public trust doctrine.” (R.
0760–64). The district court answered both of these questions in the negative. Id.
In particular, with respect to article XX, the district court held that because the Act
“did not dispose of all or part of the public’s easement in waters of the State[,]” but
instead “regulated the lawful use of those waters[,]” the Act did “not implicate the trust
responsibilities imposed upon the State in article XX, section 1.” (R. 0763). For the same
reason, the district court held that the Act did not violate the public trust doctrine. That is,

9

Having concluded that neither article XX nor the “federal public trust doctrine” applies
for want of a disposition, the district court was obligated to engage in no additional
analysis.
10
The trial court did err in determining that the Act substantially impaired the public’s
interest in the lands and waters remaining. This issue was addressed in VRA’s prior
briefs. See VRA App. Br. at 39–48; VRA Rep. Br. at 35–41.
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because the “Act did not give the public’s easement in State waters without restriction to
a private party[,]” the “public trust doctrine as defined in Illinois Central R.R. Co. [did]
not apply.” (R. 0764). The district court should have stopped there.
Surmising that there must be some “state public trust doctrine” but lamenting that
any such doctrine has “not been well-defined in case law,” the district court requested
supplemental briefing on, among other things, the purpose of any state public trust
doctrine and the factors to consider when assessing whether a regulation violated the state
public trust doctrine. (R. 0766). In making its request, the district court pointed the parties
to an article entitled A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines:
Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward Ecological Public Trust, 37
Ecology L.Q. 53 (2010). (R. 0767), in which Utah scholar Robin Kundis Craig stated
unequivocally: “Utah has not constitutionalized its public trust doctrine.” Id. at 183.
Following the supplemental briefing, the district court issued its second
memorandum decision. Ignoring Professor Craig’s observation, the district court forged
its own path by essentially grafting the common law public trust doctrine on to article
XX. By constitutionalizing the public trust doctrine for the first time in Utah
jurisprudence, the district court set up its ultimate conclusion.
In particular, the district court found that a public trust doctrine rooted in article
XX required consideration of (1) whether the statute regulates interests protected by the
public trust; (2) whether the public easement was disposed of for the purposes for which
it was acquired; (3) whether the state has given up its right of control; and (4) whether the
disposition promoted the interests of the public therein or was accomplished without any
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters that remain. (R.
1111–12). Under this distortion of the Illinois Central test, the trial court concluded that
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the Act was a regulation “tantamount” to a disposition even though the State had not
ceded control of the public trust asset and that the Act promoted no public interest. Thus,
under this newly-minted test to assess this never-before-applied constitutional version of
the state public trust doctrine, the trial court went on to conduct a trial and ultimately
found substantial impairment to invalidate the Act under article XX.
But the district court never should have gotten this far. The court’s conclusion in
its first memorandum decision that the Act “did not dispose of all or part of the public’s
easement in waters of the State” should have remained dispositive of any article XX or
public trust question – just as it was in that first memorandum decision. (R. 0763). To the
extent the district court correctly concluded that embedded within article XX is a public
trust obligation that exceeds article XX’s plain language and applies to more than “lands”
that were “acquired” by the State, however, it was proper for the court to consider
substantial impairment.
Article XX of the Utah Constitution provides that lands acquired by the State
“shall be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of as may be provided by law.”
(emphasis added). In 1892, before Utah ratified its constitution, the United States
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Illinois Central detailing the rights of the States
pertinent to lands held in trust for the public. The Court wrote:
The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost,
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public
therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the
public interest in the lands and waters remaining.
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,453 (1892) (emphasis added). The Utah
Supreme Court later described Illinois Central as “controlling” on public trust issues and
reiterated: “The Supreme Court made clear that a state can grant certain rights in
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navigable waters if those rights can be disposed of without affecting the public interest
in what remains.” Colman, 795 P.2d at 635–636 (emphasis added). In other words, the
State is permitted, “by law” to effectuate dispositions that can be accomplished without
substantial impairment.
Accordingly, to the extent the district court properly concluded that common law
public trust principles inhere in article XX and that the Act is something tantamount to a
disposition – which conclusions VRA disputes –the district court did not err in opting to
examine the question of substantial impairment to determine whether the Act was
permitted by law. Its ultimate conclusion on that front, however, was error. See VRA
App. Br. at 39-48; VRA Reply Br. at 35-41.
B.

Assuming the Conatser rights constitute “lands” that were “acquired”
by the State under article XX, section 1, they were not acquired for any
specific purpose.

Assuming that the Conatser rights – the rights attendant to an easement to use
public waters corollary to public ownership of water – were rights acquired under article
XX, these “rights” would have been acquired for the same purposes as the corpus of the
water, namely the benefit and the welfare of the people of the State as a whole, but not
for any particular purpose or use. The Court explained as much in Conatser, quoting,
among other things, Utah Code section 73-1-1 and J.J.N.P.:
“By statute, all waters in this state, whether above or under the ground, are
hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing
rights to the use thereof. Under this “doctrine of public ownership,” the
public owns state waters and has an easement over the water regardless of
who owns the water bed beneath. In granting the public this easement,
state policy recognizes an interest of the public in the use of state waters
for recreational purposes. This court has enumerated the specific
recreational rights that are within the easement's scope. They include the
right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity
when utilizing that water.
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Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ¶ 8 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In other words, the
Conatser Easement, to the extent it was acquired under article XX – a premise VRA
disputes – was acquired for and along with all beneficial uses of the water and to meet the
needs of the public as those needs change over time.
The United States Congress passed the Enabling Act laying the groundwork for
Utah’s statehood on July 16, 1894. The Enabling Act, presaging article XX of the Utah
Constitution, provided for certain enumerated lands to be transferred to the State for
particular purposes. These included school trust lands, lands for erecting public buildings
in the capital, for the University of Utah, the establishment of a deaf and dumb asylum, a
miner’s hospital, and a penitentiary, among other things. See Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138,
§§ 6–7, 10–12 , 28 Stat. 107 (1894). Utah law contains no equivalent articulation of the
“purpose” for which the waters in the state or the “easement” described in Conatser were
“acquired.” Instead, it has long been acknowledged that the general concern is one of
“public welfare” and that the purpose to which waters may or should be put, evolves over
time. This was made express in J.J.N.P., in which the Court wrote: “Public ownership is
founded on the principle that water, a scarce and essential resource in this area of the
country, is indispensable to the welfare of all the people; and the State must therefore
assume the responsibility of allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare of the
people of the State as a whole.” J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136.
In fact, the purpose for which water – or an easement for use of the water – is to be
utilized cannot be fixed. Such a result would constrain the Legislature from modifying
the priorities for use of the water in the State as necessary to accommodate societal,
scientific, and industrial evolution. That is to say, “the concept of beneficial use is not
static. Rather, it is susceptible to change over time in response to changes in science and
values associated with water use.” In re Gen. Determination of Rights to Use All of
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Water, Both Surface & Underground, Within Drainage Area of Utah Lake & Jordan
River in Utah, Salt Lake, Davis, Summit, Wasatch, Sanpete, & Juab Ctys., 2004 UT 67, ¶
46, 98 P.3d 1 (citing Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The
Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 Envtl. L. 919, 942 (1998)).
‘What is a beneficial use, of course, depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. What may be a reasonable beneficial use,
where water is present in excess of all needs, would not be a reasonable
beneficial use in an area of great scarcity and great need. What is a
beneficial use at one time may, because of changed conditions, become a
waste of water at a later time.’
In re Gen. Determination of Rights to Use All of Water, 2004 UT 67, ¶ 46 (quoting
Neuman, Beneficial Use, 28 Envtl. L. at 942 (quoting Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State
Water Res. Control Bd., 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 570, 275 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1990) (further
citation omitted)))).
A snapshot of our reservoirs, lakes, rivers and streams at any given time would
illustrate the changing contemporaneous beneficial uses of water. The law, including the
public trust doctrine has evolved to accommodate these changing values:
Since the 1970s, states and courts have extended the scope of the doctrine
to protect other public uses including hunting, boating, swimming, bathing,
and other recreational activities. Under the influence of changing public
perceptions, states have applied the public trust doctrine to preserve and
protect tidelands and other environments that provide food, shelter and
habitat for birds and marine life and that enhance the scenery and climate of
certain areas. The geographical reach of the doctrine has also been
expanded. The public trust doctrine now also encompasses non-navigable
waters and streams as well as parks, land, wetlands and wildlife. Thus,
compared to its original scope, the public trust doctrine has been expanded
considerably. The public trust theory is constantly evolving to address new
environmental threats and incorporate advances in science.
Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, 16 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 57, 82 (citation
omitted). Plainly, it is changing needs and uses that undergird the public trust doctrine
itself. That is, “the legislation which may be needed one day… may be different from the
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legislation that may be required at another day. Every legislature must, at the time of its
existence, exercise the power of the state in execution of the trust devolved upon it.”
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 460. The purpose for which water is managed is not
immutable akin to the grants of land made according to the Enabling Act, but rather must
change with the needs and uses of the population.
C.

The Court is not bound by its prior articulation of the scope of rights
set forth in Conatser.
i.

The Court is not bound by its prior assessment of the scope of rights
recognized in Conatser and J.J.N.P.

The Conatser court was charged with determining whether under then-extant law,
the public had a right to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams while
recreating using waters in the State. Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ¶ 1. In resolving this
question, the court relied upon J.J.N.P. and engaged in statutory interpretation to
determine whether the then-current version of Utah Code section 73-1-1 declaring public
ownership of the waters sanctioned the plaintiff’s position. The instant matter presents a
different question to the Court based on a different statute.
The Conatser decision and its articulation on the scope of public rights available
under the 2010 version of section 73-1-1 are not binding on this Court. The statute is
different. After Conatser, the Legislature modified that statute to provide: “The
declaration of public ownership of water in Subsection (1) does not create or recognize an
easement for public recreational use on private property.” In this respect, the Legislature
obviated Conatser. The Court is no longer bound by its interpretation of the pre-2010
version of section 73-1-1.
The question the Court now seeks to answer is whether the Legislature’s
amendment of section 73-1-1 and the remainder of the Public Waters Access Act – not
existent at the time of Conatser – improperly abrogated a constitutional right. This
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question was not addressed in Conatser. The word “Constitution” does not appear in
Conatser. Because the questions now facing this Court have not been previously
resolved, the Court is not bound by its prior delineation of the recreational easement
announced in the context of the prior version of section 73-1-1.
ii.

Review of the district court’s assessment of rights articulated in
Conatser is de novo.

The district court’s assessment of the Conatser rights presents a question of law
mandating de novo review. Beginning with the premise that, “[b]y statute, ‘all waters in
this state, whether above or under the ground, are hereby declared to be the property of
the public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof[,]’” the court in Conatser
engaged in statutory interpretation. Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ¶ 8; see also VRA App. Br. at
16–21; VRA Rep. Br. at 17–18. In so doing, the court applied a de novo standard of
review. Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ¶ 10 (“Determining the scope of an easement is a question
of law. And where issues on appeal are purely legal in nature, we review the district
court's decision for correctness, without deference.”) (internal citations omitted).
In this case, the district court assessed the rights articulated by the Utah Supreme
Court in its interpretation of a statute. “The district court's interpretation of prior
precedent, statutes, and the common law are questions of law that we review for
correctness.” Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, ¶ 6, 169 P.3d 441 (citing State v.
Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997) (“A lower court's interpretation of binding case
law presents a question of law which we review for correctness.”)). So, here, where the
Court is asked to review the district court’s assessment of precedent, the Court engages in
a de novo review, taking a “fresh look at questions of law decided by a lower court,
according no deference to its resolution of such issue.” In re Adoption of Baby B., 2012
UT 35, ¶ 41, 308 P.3d 382.
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D.

The Court must afford substantial deference to the Legislature’s
judgments about the proper scope of the rights identified in Conatser.

As previously briefed (and reiterated above), the easement defined by the
Conatser court was not the product of the Constitution, but of statute and legislative
policymaking. Accordingly, the Court must afford the Legislature’s judgments about the
scope of the Conatser rights substantial deference. It is a “well-settled proposition that all
statutes are presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging a statute bears the
burden of proving its invalidity.’” Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2009 UT 26, ¶ 5, 223
P.3d 1089 (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah
1989)).
In testing the constitutionality of legislation, ... [the Court] construe[s] the
legislation, to the extent possible, as being in compliance with the federal
and state constitutions. Given the importance of not intruding into the
legislative prerogative, we do not strike down legislation unless it clearly
violates a constitutional provision. We resolve any reasonable doubts
concerning legislation in favor of constitutionality.
State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 18, 993 P.2d 854 (internal citations omitted); see also (R.
0735) (“Every reasonable presumption and every reasonable doubt must be resolved in
favor of constitutionality.”) (citing Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21
Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958, 961-62 (Utah 1968)).11
In the words of the district court, “[a]s the branch of government responsible for
policy-making, the Legislature is in the best position to weigh the competing interests in
Utah’s natural waters, and to regulate the scope of the public’s use.” (R. 0759). In this

11

Utah Tech. Fin. Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 412 (Utah 1986) (internal quotations
omitted) (“Due respect for the legislative prerogative in law making requires that the
judiciary not interfere with enactments of the Legislature where disagreement is founded
only on policy considerations and the legislative scheme employs reasonable means to
effectuate a legitimate objective.”)
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regard, the district court recognized that “[a] future Legislature may strike a different
balance between public recreational users and private land owners.” (Id.); see also Nat'l
Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 923 (Utah 1993),
(Durham, J., concurring) (“A state can never have “undivided loyalty” to a single interest
group; it must consider the health, safety, and welfare of all its people. It also has the duty
to manage and preserve public lands for the benefit of present and future generations.”).
There is a presumption that in balancing these often competing interests, the Legislature
acts for the benefit of the people, and not to serve private interests.
Of course, at times it may be difficult for competing uses to coexist. As USAC
offered at trial, its angling members on the Provo and Weber rivers have been frustrated
on more than one occasion by other recreating members of the public who were tubing
and scaring the fish. (R. 2951; 2973–80; 2976; 3055–61; 3230). Yet both uses are
contemplated by the Conatser Easement. The Legislature, then, is charged with
regulating the public’s use of the water, including the kind of competing sues USAC’s
members find frustrating. “Some public uses must yield if other public uses are to exist at
all. The uses must be balanced and accommodated on a case by case basis.” State v. Vill.
of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d 622, 632 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). And, ultimately, it is the
Legislature, and not the courts, that shoulders the responsibility to determine whether one
particular need or use predominates over others in light of the circumstances of the day.
3.

If the Conatser rights do not qualify as “lands of the State” or have not been
“acquired” by the State, the Legislature’s authority remains limited by more
generally applicable constitutional restraints as well as by its accountability to
the public.
It has long been the case that the Legislature is vested with substantial authority

and discretion in matters of government and policy. Stated another way,
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It is a truism recognized by all the authorities that the Legislature of a state
is vested with the whole of the legislative power of the state and may deal
in any subject within the scope of constitutional government except as such
power is limited or directed by express provision of the Constitution or
necessary implication arising therefrom.
Lehi City v. Meiling, 48 P.2d 530, 535, 87 Utah 237 (1935). The Legislature enjoys the
same authority and discretion in its regulation of use of the waters in the State. The
United States Supreme Court long ago made clear that nonnavigable waters (like those at
issue in this case) are “subject to the plenary control of the designated states, including
those since created out of the territories named….” California Oregon Power, 295 U.S.
at 163–64. And it is the Legislature that has the power to act “in respect of waters and
water rights as they deem wise in the public interest.” Id at 163. This power, however, is
not without its limitations, irrespective of the application of article XX of the
Constitution. The Legislature is limited in at least two fundamental ways: (1) by express
Constitutional restrictions on legislative action; and (2) by the nature of its obligations
and the political consequences of defying the will of the majority.
First, the Constitution forms the parameters of the Legislature’s ability to legislate.
The Constitution has long been characterized as establishing “limitations, and not grants
of powers.” Lehi City, 48 P.2d at 535 (quotation omitted). By way of example, article
XX, section 2 limits legislative disposition of school trust lands. While this restriction
and that contained in article XX, section 1 – as discussed in Section 1, above, – are
inapplicable to the easement at issue here, the Legislature’s authority to manage the
waters in the State, including the easement articulated by J.J.N.P. and Conatser is, in fact
limited by more generally applied and well-established constraints plain on the face of
the Constitution including due process, equal protection/uniform application of laws, and
the prohibition against private laws. See, e.g., Whitmer v. City of Lindon, 943 P.2d 226,
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228 (Utah 1997); Provo River Water Users' Ass'n v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 934 (Utah
1993); J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137 (Utah 1982); Lehi City, 48 P.2d at 536; Eden Irr. Co. v.
Dist. Court of Weber Cty., 61 Utah 103, 211 P. 957, 959 (1922). Each of these provisions
governs the manner in which the Legislature can exercise its authority to regulate use of
the waters of the state.
Similarly, the Legislature is bound by the Constitution in its duty to protect of
other recognized and established rights. By way of example, it cannot regulate the use of
water in such a manner that gives rise to an uncompensated taking of private property
prohibited by article I, Section 22. To be sure, this concern led to passage of the Act. As
noted above and in prior briefing, the Conatser court in 2008, interpreted statute to allow
the public to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams. Conatser, 2008
UT 48, ¶ 8. In passing the Act in 2010, the Legislature made clear that it was attempting
to avoid improper takings. In certain “Declarations” passed with the Act, the Legislature
invoked the protections of article I, section 22 and made clear its objective to balance
public use of the resources in the State with those property rights specified in the
Constitution. Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-29-103 (3) & (6).
Second, the Legislature is limited by the scope of its responsibility and its
accountability to the public at large. Broadly stated, the Legislature is generally charged
with “allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare of the people of the State as a
whole.” J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136; see also HEAL Utah v. Kane County Water
Conservancy Distr., 2016 UT App 153, ¶ 5, 378 P.3d 1246. It is the power of the State to
“legislate in respect of waters and water rights as they deem wise in the public interest.”
California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. at 163. In so doing, the Legislature must be mindful
of the changing societal values.
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As discussed in Section 2.B., above, the “beneficial use” of water is a “flexible
concept, changing over time to accommodate developments in thinking about water use,
such as changes in science and values.” In re Gen. Determination of Rights to Use All of
Water, 2004 UT 67, ¶ 46 (quoting Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, 28 Envtl. L. at 946).
In 1877, the uses that predominated were for “irrigation, mining and manufacturing….”
California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. at 156 (internal quotation omitted). These have
changed over time. Mining is no longer the juggernaut of Utah’s economy. In contrast,
unmentioned in the law at the time of the Constitution, recreation now occupies a more
prominent space in the public uses of the waters – and the lands – in Utah. And,
consistent with its charge, the Legislature recognized as much in 1971 with the
amendments to Utah Code §§ 73-3-8 and 73-3-29.
But public views differ on the highest and best use of the water – irrigation versus
recreation versus industry, for example. Even within recreation, discord exists between
floaters and anglers. (R. 2973–80; 2976; 3055–61; 3230). Discord even exists between
fly fishing and bait fishing. (R. 2951; 3055–61; 3357). Nevertheless, the Legislature,
managing the water for “the people of the State as a whole,” must make determinations
prioritizing one use over another. A policy determination in favor of recreation may anger
irrigators and ranchers while pleasing the outdoor consumer industry. Alternatively, the
State’s tourist and retail industry may suffer for the Legislature’s adoption of policy
favoring landowners and energy suppliers. As a result of our form of government,
however, the Legislature does not do this in isolation. It is, in fact, accountable to the
public for its value judgments. If the Legislature fails to act in a manner consistent with
the direction and desires of the public, it does so at its peril. The public has a right and an
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obligation to voice whether it disagrees with the Legislature. And if the Legislature does
not listen, it can and will be replaced.
This is the most fundamental limit on the Legislature’s authority – the public
itself. If the Legislature misapprehends or acts contrary to the will of the majority, the
people can elect a different Legislature more attuned to their needs. As astutely put by the
district court, in its second summary judgment order: “the remedy for short-term special
interests misusing legislative processes is for majorities to organize and participate fully
in representative government. That political remedy exercised by the generation of today
is the best hope for responsible stewardship of public wilderness and waters.” (R. 1107).
A.

The State’s trust duties with respect the use of the corpus of the water
arise from the common law.

As one scholar noted, “[t]he origins of the modern public trust doctrine thesis lie
in the notion of ‘sovereign capacity’ ownership.” Richard J. Lazarus, Changing
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public
Trust Doctrine, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 631, 637 (1986). Stated otherwise, “[t]he doctrine of
public ownership is the basis upon which the State regulates the use of water for the
benefit and wellbeing of the people.” J.J.N.P, 655 P.2d at 1136. This doctrine of public
ownership and the sovereign’s role in holding public assets arise from common law. See
Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411 (1842) (“The dominion and
property in navigable waters, and in the lands under them, [are] held by the king as a
public trust ... for the common benefit. In such cases, whatever does not pass by the grant,
still remains in the crown for the benefit and advantage of the whole community.”).12
12

“Generally speaking, the law of water allocation in the United States is state law, based
on both the state sovereign ownership doctrine and the public trust doctrine. These
doctrines are closely associated, and both were inherited from the English common law,
in which the monarch held title to certain natural resources for the common benefit.
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As set forth in Section 1.C, above, “[w]ater flowing in a natural stream or in a
ditch is not subject to ownership, so far as the corpus of the water is concerned.” Bear
Lake & River Waterworks & Irrigation Co., 33 P. at 136. Concomitant to the concept of
common ownership was the concept of regulation. This is evident from Roman law and
English law and is present today: “modern notions of property emerged, these goods and
advantages became the property of the state held for the benefit of all. Finally, the rightsbased notion grew to encompass various public responsibilities.” Kanner, The Public
Trust Doctrine, 16 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 57, 64–65.
Even from the beginning, the use of the commons was regulated: The
villages determined the type and number of animals permitted in the
commons, the time of year they could be loose, how long they might graze,
and when they must be removed.
Id. “[A]lthough they changed its beneficiary from the monarchy to the public as a
whole[,]” the colonists brought the concept of public ownership and sovereign regulation
to America. Id. at 66. This common law doctrine provides the foundation for the State’s
trust duties.
In the words of the trial court, citing J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136: “Public ownership
of waters in the State does not eliminate the Legislature's authority to regulate use of
those waters. Indeed, the doctrine of public ownership is the basis for the legislature's
regulatory authority.” (R. 0749). This long-repeated maxim that the state holds the water
in trust for the benefit of the public is a product of common law that has found a place in
statute. See Murphy v. Kerr, 296 F. 536, 540 (D.N.M. 1923), aff'd, 5 F.2d 908 (8th Cir.

Under the state sovereign ownership doctrine, the state governments assumed the role of
the sovereign when they declared independence from the crown, giving them title to
sovereign lands and waters.” Logan Starr, The High Court Wades into State-Law Water
Allocation, 62 Duke L.J. 1425, 1431–32 (2013) (citations omitted).
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1925) (“Water running in a natural stream belongs to the public. By statutory enactment
… Utah … ha[s]declared in substance that all waters within the state are the property of
the public, or belong to the state. The modern expression is that such waters are owned by
the state in trust for the people.”); see also Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to
the Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the
Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 Ecology L.Q. 53, 79 (2010) (citing
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 and quoting J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136) (“Under Utah's
statutes, waters are owned by the public, and the Utah Supreme Court has tied the need
for public rights to water scarcity: water is ‘a scarce and essential resource in this area of
the country’ that ‘is indispensable to the welfare of all people; and the State must
therefore assume the responsibility of allocating the use of water for the benefit and
welfare of the people of the State as a whole.’”). As such, the State’s duties as trustee are
the product of common law.
i.

Assuming the State acts as trustee for the waters in the State, these
duties apply to any and all uses of the corpus of the water.

“The State, acting as trustee rather than owner, has assumed the responsibility of
allocating the use of the water for the benefit and welfare of all the people.” In re Uintah
Basin, 2006 UT 19, ¶¶ 34, 133 P.3d 410 abrogated on other grounds by Energy Claims
Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Grp. Ltd., 2014 UT 13, ¶¶ 34-35, 325 P.3d 70 (citing J.J.N.P., 655
P.2d at 1136). Conatser and J.J.N.P. concluded that recreational uses of the water were
“corollary” to the doctrine of public ownership codified at Utah Code section 73-1-1. As
a result, like all uses of the water in the State, recreational uses are within the scope of the
trust under which the State holds the water for the public. But this does not place
recreational uses on a pedestal over all other uses; rather they fall within the general
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responsibility of the State to manage all of the waters for all of the people considering all
competing, available, and lawful uses of the water.
Because “[b]eneficial use … chang[es] over time to accommodate developments
in thinking about water use, such as changes in science and values….”, no one use – or
any use – may be elevated to the detriment of all others. In re Gen. Determination of
Rights to Use All of Water, 2004 UT 67, ¶ 46 (quoting Neuman, Beneficial Use, 28 Envtl.
L. at 946).13 Utah law, both in case law and statute, exemplifies the evolving and myriad
uses for which the waters in the State are to be managed. The Mining Act of 1866 and the
Desert Lands Act of 1877 focused on necessary uses of water associated with the
settlement of the American west – irrigation, mining, and manufacturing. Later, in 1943,
the Court in Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957, 961 (1943), identified
beneficial uses of the water as: “domestic, culinary and irrigation purposes, and for the
generation of electric power.” And in 1971, the Legislature recognized the value and
existence of recreational uses. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 (1971); see also Nat'l Parks &
Conservation Ass'n, 869 P.2d at 919 (identifying public trust duty to protect “ecological
integrity of public lands and their public recreational uses for the benefit of the public at
large.”). The uses of water are fluid, depending on the evolution of science, industry and,
generally, the needs of the public.
Accordingly, the State exercises its trust duties with respect to any use the public
makes of the corpus of the water, taking into consideration all then-extant beneficial uses
of the water, including the uses set forth in Conatser and J.J.N.P. This trust, however,

13

Utah Tech. Fin. Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 413 (Utah 1986) (“What is public
purpose varies and changes with the times.”)
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does not require the promotion of recreational uses or imbue recreational uses with more
or less integrity than any other use.
ii.

Assuming the State acts as trustee for the waters in the State, the
State has broad authority regulate use of the water for the benefit of
the public.
a)

The scope of the State’s trust duties is to ensure a future
legislature may regulate waters according to the changing
demands of the public.

Generally stated, it is the responsibility of the State to manage the waters in the
state to serve the public welfare. “The doctrine of public ownership is the basis upon
which the State regulates the use of water for the benefit and well-being of the people.”
J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136. This does not mean, and cannot mean, that the State is
obligated to provide for or accommodate any particular use of the water. The State must
act in the public interest. California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. at 163. And the State must
ensure that future legislatures retain the ability to act in the public interest. 14
Even before Utah’s statehood, water enjoyed a well-established position as a
valuable commodity in the deserts of the American west. Over time, the uses of water
have evolved. Mining no longer holds the same place in our economy it once did. At the
time of statehood, irrigation did not mean providing for a verdant front lawn or a stream
through a mall. The needs and wants of the public evolved and will continue to evolve. It
is the purpose of the public trust to assure that the Legislature retains the ability to modify

14

Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, 16 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 57, 76 (internal
quotations omitted) (“Public trust resources are protected by the trust against unfair
dealing and dissipation, which is classical trust language suggesting the necessity for
procedural correctness and substantive care. . . . The public trust doctrine demands fair
procedures, decisions that are justified, and results that are consistent with protection and
perpetuation of the resource.”)
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the hierarchy of water uses to comport with the needs of the people at any given time.
This was made express in Illinois Central, where the Supreme Court articulated the
importance of the public trust as follows:
The legislature could not give away or sell the discretion of its successors
in respect to matter, the government of which, from the very nature of
things, must vary with varying circumstances. The legislation which may
be needed one day… may be different from the legislation that may be
required at another day. Every legislature must, at the time of its existence,
exercise the power of the state in execution of the trust devolved upon it.
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 460. Stated another way, the public trust is concerned not
with mandating any particular action or use of the waters of the State, but with assuring
that the waters are preserved and available for any public use a future legislature may
deem necessary or beneficial. The trust duties on the State prohibit the State from
alienating the trust resource to the point where the resource incurs irreparable substantial
impairment, thereby hamstringing any future legislature.
At the end of the day, whether the Legislature has comported with its trust
responsibilities is really a question of whether Legislature has taken any action that
prevents a future legislature from reaching a different conclusion as to what is best for the
public in light of societal and environmental circumstances. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at
460. As long as that question can be answered in the negative – as long as the Legislature
has preserved its ability to reach a different conclusion based upon the will of the people
– the Legislature has fulfilled its duties.
Here, the Legislature has not divested its successors of the means to legislate
according to the will of the people. And, in fact, it likely cannot do so. That is, the public
ownership of the water remains. 15 A future legislature has the ability to re-define and re15

As discussed above, the State does not have the authority to transfer title to the water; it
can only regulate its use. As a result, any attempt to deprive of the public of its ownership
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prioritize the appropriate scope of the public’s use of the waters of the state. It could
emphasize technological development, or irrigation, or mining, or recreation. It could
recognize a change in climate and divert more water for consumption or eliminate certain
recreational opportunities in order to build a hydroelectric dam. It could, if reconcilable
with the Constitution’s protection for private property rights, expand the public’s use of
the waters. But it may not inhibit the prospects of its successor legislature.
b)

The Court determines whether the Legislature has breached
its trust obligations by evaluating whether it has precluded the
Legislature from acting according to the will of the people.

As set forth above, the State’s trust responsibilities require it to assure that the
Legislature can act as it deems necessary in the future. These general trust responsibilities
do not require the Court to assess the wisdom of legislative policy making, but only
whether the State has rendered it impossible to provide for a different policy at a different
time.
The legislature presumptively acts for the benefit of the public, “with the purpose
of promoting the interests of the people as a whole ….” Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 174
U.S. at 104. Stated differently, “[t]here is a strong presumption that a Legislature
understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are
directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its discriminations are based
upon adequate grounds.” Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503, 521 (1922) (internal
quotation omitted). “[I]t is conclusively presumed a legislature acts only in the ‘public

of the waters in the state, would be ultra vires and subject to challenge. See Weese v.
Davis Cty. Comm'n, 834 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1992). Similarly, any transfer of the lands
underlying navigable waters, designated as sovereign lands of the State, and acquired
under the equal footing doctrine, would invoke the protections of article XX. Utah Code
Ann. § 65A-1-1. The State can never permanently deprive the public of the potential for
recreational use of the navigable waters in the state – including the touching of the beds.
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interest’....” Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 118 P.2d 683, 696 (Utah
1941). Thus, “courts will not lightly hold that an act duly passed by the legislature was
one in the enactment of which it has transcended its power.” Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co.,
174 U.S. at 104.
As one authority observed:
[I]t is virtually unheard of for a court to rule directly that a policy is illegal
because it is unwise; the courts are both too sophisticated and too restrained
to adopt such a procedure. Rather they may effectively overrule a
questionable policy decision by requiring that the appropriate agency
provide further justification; alternatively, the courts may, in effect, remand
the matter for additional consideration in the political sphere . . . .
Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 558 (1969–70). “The
judge, in other words, is not a primary lawgiver but instead an agent for the legislature or
framer that played that role.” State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶ 31, 267 P.3d 210. This is a
conscious allocation of power. “The more politically accountable bodies of government
make new laws; judges, who are more insulated from political processes, simply interpret
them and attempt to apply them in an objective, evenhanded manner.” Id.
The Court is not required to determine whether the Legislature has made an
appropriate determination of how water is regulated or whether one use or another should
be prioritized or accommodated at all. As is made clear in the plain language of article
XX, section 1, and also in Illinois Central, the Court’s role is to assure that property held
in trust for the people is not disposed of. That is all. It need not make value judgments
about the wisdom of regulation or the Legislature’s priority of uses. It is the Legislature’s
responsibility to make these determinations. And if the Legislature misjudges the value of
one use over another, it runs the risk that the public disagrees and determines that new
management is in order. If the Court, however, misjudges and embeds in the
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Constitution protection for one use over the other or requires the Legislature to promote
and protect any particular use it is, in effect, doing exactly what the public trust is
intended to prohibit: it is, preventing a future legislature from acting as may be necessary
in the future to the extent it conflicts with what the Court deems important today.
In regulating the public trust asset – the corpus of the water – the Legislature did
not act contrary to its responsibility as trustee over the corpus of the water. Regulation of
water rights is not only permissible in Utah, but it is a result of public ownership itself.
“Indeed, the doctrine of public ownership is the basis for the legislature’s regulatory
authority.” (R. 0749). Here, the State determined to avoid contention of an
uncompensated taking by landowners and moderate the tensions between landowners and
recreators through limits to use of waters flowing over private property. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 73-29-103 (3) & (6). It did not take away the right to recreate. It left over 12,700
miles of streams, and 3,600 miles of fishable stream flowing over public property open to
the public. (R. 2609; 2612). It allowed the public to float any river or stream capable of
being floated. Utah Code Ann. § 73-29-202. Perhaps most importantly, it left the
possibility of a future legislature to reach a different conclusion in the event the public,
the economy, industry, or science, warrants a different treatment.
c)

The Court should employ a rational basis review to evaluate
the State’s compliance with its trust duties.

The level of scrutiny a court employs when reviewing a challenge to state action
will vary depending on the nature of the challenge, but will most often be rational basis.
This standard is discussed in Section 2, above, and is not reiterated, here. Accordingly,
absent implication of a fundamental right or disparate treatment of a protected class, the
Court engages in rational basis review when evaluating a constitutional challenge to
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legislative action. Because neither protected class nor fundamental right is implicated
here, rational basis applies.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein as well as in the prior briefing of VRA and the
State of Utah in the above-captioned appeal, VRA respectfully requests that the Court
reverse the judgment of the district court and direct judgment in favor of VRA and the
State.
DATED this 1st day of May, 2017.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C.
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the fact that USAC: (a) failed to present evidence of impairment of the right to use the
water “remaining”; (b) failed to demonstrate what percentage of the waters of the State
are actually off-limits to public recreational use; and (c) failed to present evidence as to
any recreational activity other than fishing on streams. It is not known how many miles
are off-limits to anglers, birdwatchers, hunters, or any other member of the public. It is
unknown whether or to what extent the public’s recreation interest at large was actually
impaired.
The trial court improperly expanded the scope of the Utah Constitution. The trial
court found in Article XVII a right to recreate using the waters of the public not intended
by the framers of the Constitution. The trial court extended the public trust principles of
Article XX beyond the lands held in trust for the public and embedded in that provision
an unworkable test that hinders rather than promotes the legislature’s ability to regulate
public lands and resources. The trial court divested the legislature of its authority and
duty to manage the lands and resources of the State consistent with the wishes of the
electorate. By its ruling, the trial court caused the harm intended to be avoided by the
public trust doctrine. For these reasons, the trial court’s decision must be reversed and
judgment entered in favor of the State and VRA.
VII.
A.

Argument

Article XVII Did Not Recognize the Conatser Easement.

Article XVII of the Constitution provides: “All existing rights to the use of any of
the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized and
confirmed.” Early on, the trial court sought to determine whether the Conatser Easement
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was among those rights recognized and confirmed by Article XVII. The trial court
erroneously answered this question in the affirmative on the basis of Conatser v.
Johnson, 2008 UT 48, 194 P.3d 897 (“Conatser”), J.J.N.P. Co. v. Utah, 655 P.2d 1133
(Utah 1982) (“J.J.N.P.”), and Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power, 72 P.2d
648, 653–54 (Utah 1937) (“Adams”).

It concluded that, as a corollary of public

ownership of water, the Conatser Easement was rooted in the Constitution. (R.0748).
This conclusion – the foundation of all trial court rulings – is incorrect.
1.

The Conatser decision did not root a recreational
easement in the Constitution.

The Conatser Court grappled with whether the public possessed an easement
allowing it to traverse privately-owned streambeds for recreational purposes.

In

answering this question, the Court relied not on the Constitution, but on Utah Code Ann.
§ 73-1-1. The Conatser Court began its analysis stating that “[b]y statute, ‘[a]ll waters in
this state, whether above or under the ground, are hereby declared to be the property of
the public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof.’” Conatser, 2008 UT at ¶ 8
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added)). Interpreting this
statute, the Court stated, “the public owns state waters and has an ‘easement over the
water regardless of who owns the water bed beneath.’” Id. (quoting J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at
1136). The Court, quoting J.J.N.P., concluded that because the easement provides the
right to recreate “when utilizing” water, the easement permits the public to walk down
privately-owned streambeds. Id. at ¶ 14.
In J.J.N.P., the Court similarly engaged in statutory, and not constitutional,
interpretation. It quoted Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 for the proposition that “all waters in
17
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this state . . . are hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing
rights to the use thereof.” 655 P.2d at 1136. The J.J.N.P. Court went on to note “the
public does not trespass when upon such waters.” Id. (citing Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d
137 (Wyo. 1961) (emphasis added)). The Court reasoned that this easement permits the
public to perform lawful recreational activities when “utilizing [the] water.” Id. at 1136–
37 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8; Day, 362 P.2d 137). Thus, in J.J.N.P. where a
landowner sought a fish installation in a lake fully enclosed on private land, the Court
found that the public, via its easement under Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1, had recreational
interests in the water permitting the State to prohibit the fish installation. J.J.N.P., 655
P.2d at 1135–37. The J.J.N.P. Court neither made any decision related to the lakebed nor
constitutionalized a recreational easement. See, e.g., id.
Notwithstanding the Utah Supreme Court’s citation to statute to support its
holdings in both Conatser and J.J.N.P., the trial court pronounced the Conatser Easement
a constitutional right relying upon the statement from Adams that: “. . . while water is still
in the public, everyone may drink or dip therefrom or water his animals therein, . . . .
This right of the public, as well as the rights of the appropriator were confirmed by the
State Constitution in [A]rticle [XVII] . . . .” Adams, 72 P.2d at 653; (R. 0743). This
flowery language fails to cloak the Conatser Easement with constitutional protection. A
closer read of Adams shows that the Court was concerned with consumption not
recreation, let alone the use of the privately-owned streambeds beneath the water.
Adams, 72 P.2d at 652–53.
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Other cases citing Article XVII, similarly center on consumptive uses such as
irrigation, mining and manufacturing rather than recreation. In Whitmore v. Salt Lake
City, 57 P.2d 726, 731 (Utah 1936), the Court cited Article XVII in determining that
water could be appropriated for power purposes from a stream that ran through private
property. In Chandler v. Utah Copper Co., the Court noted that Article XVII of the
Constitution protected prior appropriators. 135 P. 106, 109 (Utah 1913); see also Snake
Creek Mining & Tunnel Co. v. Midway Irr. Co., 260 U.S. 596 (1923); Hanson v. Salt
Lake City, 205 P.2d 255 (Utah 1949); Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 289 P.
116, 117 (Utah 1930); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 164 P. 856, 857
(Utah 1916); Cole v. Richards Irr. Co., 75 P. 376 (Utah 1904).
The case law addressing Article XVII and pre-dating Conatser focuses almost
exclusively on consumptive and appropriated uses of water and does not recognize
Article XVII as protecting any public recreational easement over streambeds or
confirming public ownership of the waters. Using waters for recreation did not arise in
Utah jurisprudence until J.J.N.P. and Conatser. And both J.J.N.P. and Conatser ground
recreational rights in Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1, not Article XVII.
In “the absence of any constitutional restraint . . . the legislature may act upon any
subject within the sphere of government.” Kimball v. City of Grantsville City, 57 P. 1, 5
(Utah 1899); see also Shurtleff, 2006 UT at ¶ 18. Because the Conatser Easement grows
from statutory roots, when the Utah legislature enacted the Act, no constitutional
violation occurred. The Act merely clarified and defined the public’s statutory right to
use of Utah’s waters.
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2.

The Framers did not recognize public ownership or
recreational rights.

This Court has set forth the standard and methodology for interpreting the
Constitution, identifying its primary search as one “for intent and purpose.” In re Young,
1999 UT 6, ¶ 15, 976 P.2d 581, 586–87. Stated otherwise, the end goal of constitutional
construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of our Constitution. Id. “The
process of interpretation, moreover, involves the judge in an exercise that implicates not
the judge’s own view of what the law should be, but instead a determination of what the
law is as handed down by the legislature or framers of the constitution.” State v. Walker,
2011 UT 53, ¶ 31, 267 P.3d 210 (Lee, J., concurring); see also American Bush v. City of
S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 86, 140 P.3d 1235 (Durrant, J., concurring). Sources to
consider when conducting this interpretation include “provisions dealing generally with
the same topic,” the “framer’s intent,” and “historical evidence . . . supported by
independent research . . . .” In re Young, 1999 UT at ¶ 15, n.5. Considering these
sources, the trial court’s decision to expand Article XVII to include the Conatser
Easement is contrary to the intent of the framers.
Any interpretation of the Constitution requires, first, an examination of the plain
language. Summit Water Distribution Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2011 UT 43, ¶ 12,
259 P.3d 1055 (citing Grand Cnty. v. Emery Cnty., 2002 UT 57, ¶ 29, 52 P.3d 1148);
American Bush, 2006 UT at ¶ 10. Article XVII of the Utah Constitution provides: “All
existing rights to the use of any of the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial
purpose, are hereby recognized and confirmed.” The plain language confirms only the
“rights” to use of the water extant at the time of the Constitution. There is no reference to
20
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recreation or public ownership of the waters.

These issues were deferred to the

Legislature.
In following this Court’s sanctioned approach of interpreting constitutional
provisions in terms of the “then-contemporary understanding of what they were to
accomplish,” the conclusion dictated by Article XVII’s plain language finds support.
Termed the “Irrigation Article,” Article XVII focused solely on protecting the public’s
appropriated rights for use of water such as for irrigation, mining and manufacturing.
i)

Pre-statehood laws demonstrate the absence of a recreational
easement extant at the time of the Constitution.

As an arid territory, Utah’s laws pertaining to water rights existed not only in the
territorial laws, but also in Utah specific water laws adopted by the legislature of the
territory of Utah. In all of these laws, water rights were couched squarely in the use of
the body of water for irrigation, mining and manufacturing. These laws define the
“existing” rights confirmed by Article XVII.
The Federal Laws enacted in 1866 state, in the section for Desert Lands, that the
“water supply upon the public lands . . . shall remain and be held free for the
appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes
subject to existing rights.” Compiled Laws of Utah, Vol. 1 Desert Lands, § 426 (1888).
Similarly, the section on Water Rights provides that “whenever, by priority of possession,
rights to the use of water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing or other purposes, have
vested and accrued . . . the possessor and owners of such vested rights shall be
maintained and protected in the same.”

Id. at Water Rights, § 422.

The then-

contemporary meaning of water rights in the context of the Federal Territorial Acts
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equates to the use of the body of water for survival purposes, namely irrigation, mining
and manufacturing.
In 1880, the Legislature for the Territory of Utah enacted a Water Code
recognizing the rights of prior water-appropriators for irrigation, mining, and
manufacturing.

See Compiled Laws of Utah, Vol. 2, Water Rights, § 2775–2789.

Similar to the Territorial Acts, the Code stated that, “[a] right to the use of water for any
useful purpose, such as domestic purposes, irrigating lands, propelling machinery,
washing and sluicing ores, and other like purposes, is hereby recognized . . . .” Id. at
§ 2780, s. 6. Notably, the language of this statute foreshadows that of Article XVII and
cites as examples of rights for any “useful” purpose appropriated rights, not recreational
rights.
These pre-Constitution laws demonstrate that the meaning of the words “use of
water” leading up to the enactment of Article XVII pertained exclusively to irrigation,
mining, manufacturing “and other like purposes.”
ii)

The Constitutional Convention Proceedings leave public
ownership to the Legislature.

When attempting to discern the intent and purpose behind a constitutional
provision, the constitutional convention proceedings prove a valuable resource. See, e.g.,
American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1072–73 (Utah 1985); Summit Water
Distribution Co., 2011 UT at ¶ 12.

The Constitutional Convention proceedings on

Article XVII reinforce the meaning of the “use of water” that saturates the Territorial
Acts and the 1880 Water Code. Article XVII was familiarly referred to as the “irrigation
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article,”

3

and the “minority report on the subject of irrigation.”

Constitutional

4

Convention Proceedings (“Const. Conv. Proc.”), Apr. 5, 1895 at 711. The “emphasis on
private ownership of water rights clearly dominated the thinking of delegates to the
constitutional convention. . . . [And the debate] focused on assuring the sanctity of the
private right to use water, and on confirmation of claims on this limited resource that
were already in place.” Jean Bickmore White, The Utah State Constitution: A Reference
Guide, Article XVII, 179 (1998). Equally apparent is the absence of any intent to create
or recognize a recreational easement. Id. For example, Mr. Eldredge discussed the
multiple uses of water relevant to Article XVII:
There are different classes of rights we acquire to water; there are certain
rights we acquire which only constitute a right to the use of the water, as for
illustration, there may be a mill situated upon a stream and that is permitted
to divert the water from its channel, carry it down and over its wheel and
pass it back into the stream, and thus not infringe upon the rights of any
person that may have acquired a right to the use of the water or even a right
to the absorption of the water below them. Now that is one class of right.
Another class of right would be a farmer. He takes a stream of water upon
his land and he exhausts that stream. There is not one particle of it that
passes off from his farm to go on to afford its use for somebody else, hence,
there are two different modes in which the rights to water attach.
Const. Conv. Proc., Apr. 19, 1895 at 1216. The then-contemporary meaning of water
rights ultimately confirmed by Article XVII as understood by Mr. Eldredge and his
colleagues pertained to privately-acquired use of water such as for irrigation, mining and
manufacturing. The framers made no mention of recreation or streambeds. They did,
3

See The Irrigation Article, Salt Lake Trib., Mar. 11, 1895; Work of the Committee –
Irrigation Questions, Salt Lake Trib., Mar. 14, 1895; That Irrigation Article, Deseret
News, Mar. 23, 1895; Irrigation in the Constitution, Deseret News, Apr. 6, 1895.
4

Available at http://le.utah.gov/documents/conconv/utconstconv.htm .
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however, decline to constitutionalize public ownership – the very principle to which the
trial court attached a right to recreate.
At first, the debates over Article XVII centered on the “majority” report that
5

vested water rights in the State, and by extrapolation, the people of the State. See id. at
1203. The framers expressly rejected this majority report after a feeling of general
uneasiness about including these provisions in the Constitution dominated the framers’
discussions.

Id. at 1203, 1209, 1214.

Most framers shared the sentiments of

Mr. Chidester, who preferred to leave the issue of water rights in the hands of the
Legislature, agitating “I think it is unsafe to couch [water rights issues] within the
Constitution, but leave that to future legislation, and I think that they will govern this
matter and enact laws that will be calculated to further the ends of justice in this regard.”
Id. at 1203. Mr. Hammond echoed these thoughts: “I have been a user of irrigation water
ever since this Territory was formed, . . . and I am satisfied and have been to leave this
matter entirely in the hands of our Legislature . . . .” Id. at 1213. Mr. Barnes concurred:
“the whole matter should be left to the Legislature. Id. at 1214.
Others worried the provision would effectively divest farmers of long-held rights
to the use of particular water. As Mr. Jolley surmised,
5

The original proposal included Section 1 that provided for public ownership. It read:
The waters of all natural springs, streams, lakes and collections of still
water, within the boundaries of the State are hereby declared to be the
property of the State; but such ownership shall in no way impair any
existing lawfully acquired right to the use of said waters.

Jean Bickmore White, Charter for Statehood: The Story of Utah’s State Constitution 78
(1996) (photograph of James P. Low’s workbook).
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I would state that there appears to be a great uneasiness among the farmers
of this Territory in relation to the word ceding the water to the State. They
feel as though they ought to be protected very pointedly in their already
acquired rights, and that the Legislature will be a safe body to regulate
those things . . . .”
Id. at 1204; see also id. at 1216 (Mr. Eldredge).
In the end, the framers would not adopt the originally proposed language that
would have constitutionalized public ownership of the waters.

Rather, the framers

6

adopted a portion of what was proposed as the “minority report.” The framers did so to
put farmers and other irrigators at ease that their then-existing entitlements to water
would not be abrogated by operation of the constitution. See, e.g., Const. Conv. Proc.,
Apr. 20, 1895 at 1233. When given the opportunity to adopt a constitutional provision
naming water rights as public property and to enumerate the scope of the rights of the
public in the waters, the framers declined, leaving the issue to the Legislature.
During discussion of Article XVII, the framers focused on the use of the corpus of
the water itself and ensuring that those who used and appropriated the water preConstitution for irrigation purposes would not lose their rights with Utah’s entrance into
the United States.

They did not address recreation.

6

Reading into Article XVII a

Section 1 of the minority report provided:“All existing rights to the use of any of the
waters of this State for any useful purpose, shall be recognized and confirmed. Const.
Conv. Proceedings, Apr. 5, 1895 at 711. Section 2 originally included in the minority
report was never adopted as the framers were “in favor of leaving the whole thing to [the
legislature and] not directing that they shall do certain things.” Const. Conv.
Proceedings, Apr. 19 1895 at 1217.
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currently held by the state or later acquired by the state – to a determination by a court as
to whether such a regulation was in the public’s interest. If the trial court’s definition of
“disposition” is sustained, there is no restriction on what can be challenged.

The

determination of what is in the best interest of the public will ultimately not be made by
the State’s elected body, but by its courts.
Conversely, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “disposition” as: “1. The act of
transferring something to another's care or possession, esp. by deed or will; the
relinquishing of property. . . .” DISPOSITION, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
Application of this definition of “dispose” is consistent with Illinois Central, its progeny,
and American jurisprudence, all of which require a cession or abdication of control.
Application of this definition would avoid myriad potential suits by aggrieved recreators
prohibited in any way from hunting or fishing when and where they want. Application of
this definition would have, and should have, ended the inquiry as to the Act, which is
nothing more than a revocable regulation subject to change by a future legislature.
The Legislature has retained the capacity to change the law with respect to stream
access at any time should the public so demand. In the words of the trial court, a
different legislature may strike a different balance. And for this reason, it was error to
conclude that the Act violated the public trust doctrine.
D.

The Act Did Not Substantially Impair Public Interest in the
Waters that Remain.

Trial was held on the issue of whether the Act “substantially impaired the public’s
interest in the lands and waters remaining.” The question of substantial impairment
exists not only in the trial court’s erroneous test, but in Illinois Central after
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determination of a disposition. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 454-55; (R. 1111-1112).
Yet, even if the trial court was correct to apply the test that it did, the trial court
nevertheless erred in its determination that USAC met its burden to prove that the Act
substantially impaired the public’s interest in the lands and waters remaining.
Utah jurisprudence places a heavy burden on parties endeavoring to prove
legislation unconstitutional: “‘[S]tatutes are presumed to be constitutional until the
contrary is clearly shown.

It is only when statutes manifestly infringe upon some

constitutional provision that they can be declared void. Every reasonable presumption
must be indulged in and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of constitutionality.’”
Jones v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, ¶ 10, 94 P.3d 283 (quoting Salt
Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994) (quoting In re Estate of Baer, 562
P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1977))) (emphasis added). This was the burden articulated by the
trial court. (R. 0735). USAC did not meet this burden.
In reaching its conclusion that the Act substantially impaired the public’s interest
in the lands and waters that remain based solely on the purported “closure of more than
2,700 miles of Utah rivers and streams to almost all public recreational use” the trial
court failed to resolve all reasonable presumptions and reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality.

(R. 2650).

The trial court’s conclusion that the Act substantially

impairs the public’s interest in the lands and waters that remain is incorrect for the
following reasons: (1) the trial court failed to examine the impairment of the lands and
waters “remaining”; (2) the

proper scope of any quantitative inquiry must have

considered more than “fishable miles” of streams and rivers; (3) the trial court grounded
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its conclusion on unreliable numbers and resolved doubts against rather than in favor of
constitutionality; and (4) the trial court’s analysis misconstrued the question presented by
limiting its inquiry to a quantitative assessment of fishing rather than a qualitative
assessment of recreation.
1.

The trial court did not examine what “remained.”

Both the trial court’s new test and the Illinois Central test provide that in the
event of a disposition (or a statute tantamount to a disposition), the court must examine
whether the state action was accomplished “without substantial impairment of the
public’s interest in the lands and waters remaining.” This aspect of the test asks the court
to examine not the property disposed of, but what is left of the public’s interest after
disposition. Here, the trial court erred in examining how much was purportedly lost by
passage of the Act rather than what remained after passage of the Act.
Admittedly, this is a conceptually difficult inquiry when applied to the Act or any
statute regulating public lands or waters at large. It raises difficult questions such as
causation (i.e., whether the Act or some other variable impaired an ability to recreate),
quality (i.e., some miles of river may be more valuable to anglers than others), or degree
(i.e., what constitutes “substantial” impairment). Perhaps cognizant of this difficulty, all
public trust doctrine tests of which VRA is aware, other than that which the trial court
crafted, require a tangible disposition of specific property, the impact of which can be
more easily determined.

11

A revocable regulation will not suffice.

11

By way of example, a sale of dock on a large reservoir avoids the question of
causation. It is it is a single transaction the impact of which can be independently
assessed as opposed to multiple layers of regulation. By way of example, regulations
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Nevertheless, the question – as framed by both the trial court and Illinois Central –
requires examination of the remainder and not the property disposed. Here, USAC
presented no evidence that any angler or, in fact, any recreator was prohibited from
engaging in recreation on available waters because of the Act. Stated another way,
USAC offered no testimony that a member was precluded from accessing public waters
because of the Act. In this respect, the trial court erred in finding that USAC met its
burden as to substantial impairment of what “remains.”
2.

Any quantitative impairment analysis required
assessment of flat water and non-fishable miles of streams.

Because the Act did not negatively affect angling on flat water, such as lakes and
reservoirs, USAC focused its arguments on – and limited its evidence to – rivers and
streams and in particular “fishable rivers and streams.” The trial court appears to have
been hooked by this limited focus and incorrectly restricted its analysis to fishable rivers
and streams. While recognizing, initially, that ascertaining the scope of any impairment
of the “lands and waters remaining” required an analysis of the entire proper public trust
resource, namely the waters of the state of Utah generally, the trial court deviated from
this analysis at trial, improperly focusing solely on “fishable streams.”
The trial court’s narrow focus proves problematic. The Act’s application is not
limited to streams, let alone “fishable” streams. The Act applies to public waters, defined
as all waters “flowing or collecting on the surface: (A) within a natural or realigned
prohibit bait fishing on certain streams and rivers of the state, meaning those streams and
rivers were off limits to certain types of anglers with or without the Act. Similarly, a sale
of a dock may actually impair the public’s interest in the remainder if no other public
access point exists effectively making the lake off limits to everyone despite the fact that
the lake itself – apart from the dock – remains in public ownership.
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channel; or (B) in a natural lake, pond, or reservoir on a natural or realigned channel.”
Utah Code Ann. § 73-29-102(8). Likewise, the Conatser Easement is not limited to
fishing. Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ¶ 8 (quoting J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137). It applies to all
recreators – bird watchers, hunters, fur trappers and anglers, to name a few. Any focus
solely on streams is artificial. Any focus on “fishable” waters is artificial. Non-angling
recreators are not restricted to “fishable streams.” Bird-watchers do not require the
presence of sport fish or a viable fishery to bird watch. Hunters and fur trappers do not
need sport fish to partake in their desired recreation. (See, e.g., R. 3714). And any water
in the State with sufficient depth and flow is floatable and accessible to boaters under the
plain language of the Stream Access Act – it need not be “fishable” to be floatable. Utah
Code Ann. § 73-29-202(1).
Set forth in the stipulated facts, USAC “estimates” that Utah has 20,800 miles of
river and streams, 850 miles of which are navigable, 12,700 miles of which traverse
public or tribal grounds and 7,250 miles of which traverse private ground. (R. 2435). At
trial, however, no evidence was presented regarding what recreational opportunities on
any of these miles or any flat water, – public or private – were foreclosed by the Act
other than stream angling. (See, passim, R. 2876-4542).
The trial court disregarded these shortcomings and instead evaluated impairment
solely on the basis of “fishable” miles. (R. 2659; 4855). The 2,700 miles representing
43% of the purportedly 6,419 miles of fishable streams may have relevance for a subset
of the angling public that prefers to fish on rivers and streams, but it is meaningless when
it comes to the purported effect of the Act on anglers who prefer to use flat water, or non43
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angling recreators that do not require a “fishable” stream. The amount of water available
to all water recreators in Utah besides that subset of anglers who fish on rivers and
streams remains wholly unknown. Accordingly, the trial court’s conclusion that the Act
represents the “closure of 43% of Utah’s fishable rivers and stream miles to nearly all
fishing, and to all hunting, wading, swimming, bird-watching, and any other recreational
activity utilizing the water” is not supported based upon the evidence presented and
USAC’s burden. (R. 2654-2655). The quantitative degree of impairment is thus, also,
unknown and it was error to conclude otherwise.
3.

The trial court failed to resolve all doubts in favor of
constitutionality.

USAC, VRA and the State stipulated that the miles of fishable streams that flow
over private property are not known with full accuracy. There are numerous factors to
consider such as (1) whether there is Walk-In-Access (“WIA”); (2) whether a property
owner permits fishing on her property; and, (3) whether a property owner has cultivated
or marked her property with no trespassing signs.

(R. 2435-2436).

Moreover, the

numbers offered by the State on the Stream Access Map, as clearly explained with their
offering, are simply guidelines provided as general reference and the accuracy is not
guaranteed: “the Information provided is not binding on courts, prosecuting attorneys or
other law-enforcement agencies.” (R. 2433, Ex. 2).
The trial court recognized that the State’s numbers suffer from multiple errors.
The Stream Access Map does not properly reflect streambeds owned by municipalities
where there may be public access. (R. 2628-2634; 3337-3341; 3344; 3362; 3703-3707;
3710; 3743-3747; 3881-3883; 3890-3892; 4443; 4451-4452; 4462-4463; 4489-4490).
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The DWR Regional Aquatics Managers testified to errors on the Stream Access Map as a
result of oversight or human error or another unknown culprit. (Id.; Exs. 1; 4.1– 4.5; 22–
25). Further, the numbers are unreliable because “fishable streams” is a subjective term.
(R. 2432; 2628-2634; 3291-3292; 3381; 4449; 4464-4465). DWR Regional Aquatics
Managers defined this term differently, all concluding that a “fishable” stream has sport
fish, but acknowledging the need to make a subjective determination of what anglers
prefer. (Id.). Thus streams may have been excluded from the Map that one angler or
even a different DWR Manager might consider fishable. (Id.). Similarly, streams today
deemed non-navigable, may tomorrow be deemed navigable and, thus, open to the public
even under the Act. (R. 2251). The trial court disregarded this very real fluidity in the
applicable numbers.
Despite the inaccuracies and unknowns inherent in the State’s numbers, the trial
court relied on these numbers, dismissing any inaccuracies as failures of the State rather
than resolving these inaccuracies in favor of constitutionality. For example, rather than
conclude that Walk-In-Access renders the number of purported fishable miles “closed”
under the Act artificially high, the trial court brushed off WIA noting that the landowner
can revoke such access without cause on 30-day’s notice. (R. 2655; Ex. 6). The trial
court disregarded the fact that many property owners do not always mark their property
or otherwise allow permissive fishing on their property. Given USAC’s burden and the
trial court’s duty to resolve doubts in favor of constitutionality, the trial court’s finding of
a substantial impairment rooted solely in unreliable, turbid, stream mile estimates cannot
be sustained.
45
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4.

The trial court’s analysis misconstrues the question
presented.

The trial court concluded that the Act substantially impaired the public’s interest
in what remains because it purportedly placed a quantity of Utah’s water – 43% of Utah’s
fishable rivers and streams – beyond the limits of Utah’s recreators. (R. 2659; 4855).
This analysis exposes a misunderstanding of the question presented. The question was
whether the Act substantially impaired the public’s interest in the lands and waters that
remain. That is, the focus is on the water that remains and the public’s ability to exercise
its interest – namely its recreational easement – on these waters. (R. 0763; 2015-2018);
see also Weden, 135 Wash. 2d 678; Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v., 671 P.2d
1085; State v. Public Service Comm., 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957); Vill. of Lake Delton,
286 N.W.2d at 632. It is not tied to a particular property. (Id.). This requires a
qualitative, rather than a purely quantitative assessment. And the reported quality is high.
As the trial court found, the public continues to enjoy the ability to engage in
every type of recreation in and on the waters that remain. (R. 1629; 1636-1640; 19481959; 2637-2640). That some rivers and streams in Utah may be off limits to certain
types of recreation does not change the fact that Utah’s angling public remains on the
whole satisfied with its angling experiences. (R. 3255-3256; 3262-3263; 4229-4231;
Ex. 9, pp. 91–92; Ex. 10.1, pp. 93-135).
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Utah anglers report that private property

restrictions have not substantially impaired their angling experience. (R. 1629; 263712

Here, again, however the trial court ignored its duty to resolve all doubts in favor of
constitutionality, blatantly dismissing a survey finding that “relatively few respondents
felt that private property restrictions contribute to major limitations in access preferred
fishing areas.” (R. 2640; Ex. 9, pp. 91-92).
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2640). Utah anglers report high levels of satisfaction. And the Utah DWR Regional
Aquatics Mangers confirmed this conclusion, testifying that all types of angling
experiences exist in their region even after the Act. (R. 3336-3337; 3366; 3703; 3709;
3720; 3748-3749; 3895-3896; 4468-4469).
Of import, no evidence was offered concerning whether the experience of any type
of recreators other than anglers and boaters was impaired even an iota. The trial court
could not determine whether birdwatchers, hunters, trappers, or any other group, are
negatively impacted by the Act. (See, passim, R. 2876-4542).
The public’s interest – the recreational easement – continues to flourish for anglers
on the waters that remain. The trial court’s finding of substantial impairment based on an
artificial number –fishable miles – extrapolated to an improper conclusion about all water
recreators in Utah, when that number was explicitly limited to fishable streams, provides
no meaningful measurement of impairment. USAC limited its focus to a very narrow
subset of the fishing population on a very narrow subset of Utah’s waters.

The

experience of so few cannot be grafted onto the experience of all water recreators,
especially in light of contradictory evidence indicating high levels of satisfaction in the
angling community and the absolute absence of any evidence on the impact on
birdwatchers, hunters, trappers, or any other subset of recreators. USAC did not meet its
burden to show that the Act has substantially impaired the public’s interest in the waters
that remain.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, VRA respectfully requests that the decisions of
the trial court be reversed and judgment entered in favor of VRA. VRA also respectfully
requests an award of its costs on appeal.
DATED this 26th day of May, 2016.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C.
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language as we understand it and we conceive the framers meant it to be
understood.
Id. at 637.
The court’s role is not to adjudicate or extrapolate “natural law”; it is to apply the
Constitution according to its language. The Constitution does not cloak “natural law” in
constitutionality either inherently or through Article I, Section 25. It does not impose
upon the legislature limits not specifically articulated. Here, the Act does not violate any
constitutional right to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams. No such
right exists.
III.

ARTICLE XVII DID NOT RECOGNIZE OR CONFIRM A RIGHT IN THE
PUBLIC TO TOUCH THE PRIVATELY-OWNED BEDS OF NONNAVIGABLE WATERS.
USAC argues at length that the ownership of water and, thus, the claimed “right”

to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams is rooted in natural law and
has existed since the time of Justinian and, thus, such an “existing” right was confirmed
by the plain language of Article XVII. (Opposition at pp. 23–32). Irrespective of the
question of ownership of water, USAC’s claimed right to touch the privately-owned beds
of non-navigable streams is of recent statutory derivation and not one that traveled from
the Roman Empire to England, across the Atlantic Ocean, and over the plains to Utah.
And as a statutory “right”, the Legislature operated well within the bounds of its authority
to change, modify, or limit the public’s ability to touch the privately-owned beds of
streams.
In their opening briefs, VRA and amicus cite to and quote from the records of the
Constitutional Convention demonstrating: (a) that the focus of Article XVII was to
preserve established appropriated rights; (b) that the result of the convention was to defer
questions regarding the ownership and administration of waters “in the state” to the
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legislature; and (c) that there was no attention paid or reference made to any public
“right” to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams. (VRA Brief at pp.
17–27; Amicus Brief at pp. 9–14). Notably, USAC does not dispute this characterization
with any reference to the conventions proceedings themselves. (See generally
Opposition)
A.

A “Use” Does Not Equate to a “Right.”

Article XVII, by its plain language, confirms then-existing “rights”; it does not
confirm existing “uses.” VRA stipulated to certain historical “uses.” (Opposition at p.
22). It did not stipulate that those “uses” derived from any inherent or natural rights or
that any corollary “right” was found in the contemporary law. In fact, the trial court
specifically concluded that prior to Conatser, it was understood that landowners were
entitled to exclude the public from the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams.
(R. 2620, ¶ 40). The correctness of the trial court’s conclusion on this point is not
challenged by any party on appeal.
Nor does the case law relied upon by USAC demonstrate any recognized or
inherent public right to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams. That
case law addresses only the rights to the use and public ownership of the corpus of the
water, not the submerged lands beneath. This is evident from USAC’s own treatment of
these cases.4
4

By way of example, USAC cites to Munroe v. Ivies, 2 Utah 535, 538 (1880) with the
quote: “This is a free country, and the lands are open to all, and the appropriation of
water is open to all…” (emphasis added). (Opposition at p. 24). It cites Salt Lake City v.
Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co., 24 Utah 249, 67 P. 672, 677 (1902), for the
premise that the public owns and has always owned Utah’s waters, irrespective of
statute. Aside from the fact that this case did not address any use of the beds of the
waters, it also expressly notes that the rights of the public are limited. USAC’s own
parenthetical summarizes the holding as “Utah’s waters are public waters until diverted.”
(Opposition at p. 24) (emphasis added). That is, the public ownership described in
12
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Public ownership of the corpus of the water is not in dispute in this appeal. In fact,
it is expressly preserved and confirmed by the Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1.
Notably absent from USAC’s Opposition is any case from any jurisdiction or any time
that recognizes a “natural right” or a constitutional public right to touch the privatelyowned beds of non-navigable streams. The only case cited for this premise is Conatser.
The Conatser decision, however, does not root the scope of the easement in “natural law”
or the Constitution.5
B.

Jurisprudence Demonstrates the Absence of a “Right” to Touch
Privately-Owned Beds of Non-Navigable Streams.

USAC argues that “public ownership of natural waters can be traced to both
Roman law and natural law.” (Opposition at p. 23). Even if broadly true, this point is
immaterial. As discussed above, “natural law” is not a basis on which to “challenge laws
enacted by a democratically elected legislature.” Gardner, 947 P.2d at 637. More
fundamentally, however, even if public ownership of water is rooted in “natural law”,
there is no suggestion that any “right” to touch the privately-owned beds is also so rooted
or that such a “right” existed to be “confirmed” in Article XVII of the Constitution in
1895. The converse is true.
1.

Landowners Have a Long-Recognized Right to Exclude the Public
from Privately-Owned Submerged Lands.

The Utah Constitution was drafted in 1895. Article XVII confirmed only thenextant “rights to the use of any waters in this State for any useful or beneficial
addition to applying only to the corpus of the water was also inherently limited. None of
the cases cited address the use of the beds. All address the use of the corpus of the water.
See Uintah Basin v. United States, 2006 UT 19, ¶ 34, 133 P.3d 410; Provo River Water
Users Ass’n v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 933 n. 8 (Utah 1993); Adams, 72 P.2d at 652-53;
Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P. 580, 584 (1925).
5

See Section I, supra.
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purpose….” The claimed public “right” to touch the privately-owned beds of nonnavigable streams was not among those recognized rights.
In 1891 – a mere four years before Utah’s Constitutional Convention – the United
States Supreme Court undertook the task of adjudicating the ownership of riparian lands
in Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 11 S. Ct. 808 (1891). The Hardin Court surveyed the
historical treatment of ownership of those lands and the rights of the public therein. In so
doing, the Court recognized the long history of private ownership: “And centuries before
Justinian, Cicero spoke of the many lands, houses, lakes, ponds, places, and possessions
confiscated by Scylla, and conferred upon his own favorites.” Hardin, 140 U.S. at 390
(emphasis added). The Court did not, however, recognize an unimpeachable right of the
public to access and utilize such private property. Rather, it recognized the positive right
of landowners to exclude the public.
In a summary statement, the Hardin Court wrote:
The cases are innumerable in which actions of trespass have been sustained
for fishing in a several fishery, (which is the exclusive right to fish in one’s
own waters, or is derived therefrom by grant;) or in which the action of
trespass has been defended by the plea of common fishery, (which is the
right to fish in the waters of another.) The right of public fishery is never
mentioned except in connection with tidewaters where the title to the land
is in the crown. It is never said that this right exists in lakes or ponds, or
in any other fresh waters.
Hardin, 140 U.S. at 389 (emphasis added). Express in this statement is that there was, in
1891, recognition of private ownership of lands and waters and recognition of the right to
exclude the public. This contradicts not only any contention of a natural public right to
touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable bodies of waters, but even the more
general principle of “public ownership” that USAC contends is recognized in Article
XVII.
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The Hardin Court undertook a review of the historical common law and identified
myriad cases in which claims of trespass were adjudicated not on the basis of a general
right of the public to use the corpus of the water, but upon the question of whether the
property was properly subject to public or private ownership.
By way of example, the Hardin court refers to the decision of the courts of
England in Bristow v. Cormican, L.R. 3 App. Cas. 641, in which a riparian landowner
pursued an action for trespass for fishing in a lake. Hardin, 140 U.S. at 391. Ultimately,
the claim of trespass was rejected because the lake (15 miles in length, 10 miles in
breadth) was subject to public ownership and not on the grounds that the public had an
inherent right of access to private lands and waters.
The matter of Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 33 N.J.L. 223, a case cited by the
Hardin court arising out of New Jersey, involved a similar claim of trespass defended on
the grounds that “the lake belonged to the state.” Plaintiff’s claim of trespass was
sustained. The court wrote: “The title of the individual, being personal in him, is
exclusive, subject only to a servitude to the public for the purposes of navigation, if the
waters are navigable in fact.” Hardin, 140 U.S. at 395 (emphasis added).
In Beckman v. Kreamer, 443 Ill. 447, the Illinois Supreme Court adjudicated the
rights of the public to fish on waters claimed to be the subject of private ownership. The
Court there concluded: “By the common law, a right to take fish belongs so essentially to
the right of soil in streams or bodies of water, where the tide does not ebb or flow, that if
the riparian proprietor owns upon both sides of such stream no one but himself may come
upon the limits of his land and take fish there….” Hardin, 140 U.S. at 396 (citing
Kreamer, 443 Ill. 447). The public had no right of access or use of the stream in question.
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The cases referenced above were among a number relied upon in Hardin. None of
that precedent was disturbed. The Hardin Court explicitly recognized that waters and
submerged lands may be subject to private ownership and, in such instance, the owner
then had the right to exclude. In neither Hardin nor the myriad cases cited therein is there
mentioned a “natural right” that allowed the public access to privately owned lands for
fishing or any other use of water. The public had no right – natural or otherwise – to
access or touch such lands that could have been confirmed by Article XVII of the
Constitution in 1895.
2.

Determination of Riparian Landowners’ Rights Is in the Domain of
the Legislature.

The United States Supreme Court in 1894 was again asked to address the question
of ownership of submerged lands in the matter of Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
As a general premise, it wrote: “The common law of England upon this subject, at the
time of emigration of our ancestors, is the law of this country except so far as it has been
modified by the charters, constitutions, statutes, or usages of the several colonies, or by
the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Shively, 152 U.S. at 14. The Shively
Court recognized that it is the prerogative of the States – through their legislatures – to
determine the bounds of riparian ownership and the associated rights.
In conjunction with its survey of the laws of various states on the question of the
extent of riparian ownership, the Shively Court reverted to and relied upon its Hardin
decision from 1891, quoting:
This right of the states to regulate and control the shores of tide-waters, and
the land under them, is the same as that which is exercised by the crown in
England. In this country the same rule has been extended to our great
navigable lakes, which are treated as inland seas; and also, in some states,
to navigable rivers, as the Mississippi, the Missouri, the Ohio, and, in
Pennsylvania, to all the permanent rivers of the state; but it depends on the
16
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law of each state to what waters and to what extent this prerogative of the
state over the lands under water shall be exercised.
Shively, 152 U.S. at 46 (quoting Hardin, 140 U.S. at 382) (emphasis added). More
succinctly, the Shively Court quoted with approval Justice Brewer’s dissent in Hardin:
“Beyond all dispute, the settled law of this court, established by repeated decisions, is
that the question how far the title of a riparian extends is one of local law. For a
determination of that question, the statutes of the state and the decisions of its highest
court furnish the best and final authority.” Shively, 152 U.S. at 46 (quoting Hardin,
140 U.S. at 402, Brewer J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Under the decisions of Hardin in 1891 and Shively in 1894, it is clear that the
question of the scope of ownership of submerged lands, and the rights associated
therewith, were questions to be left to the states and their legislatures. While certain
governing principles flow from the common law of England, no natural right of access or
use or even of public ownership of all waters are among the principles that might restrict
the authority of a state legislature. In 1895, the framers of the Utah Constitution acted
consistent with these principles and left the administration of water and the ownership of
water to the judgment of the legislature.
C.

The Legislature’s Regulation of the Conatser Easement Does Not
Implicate Constitutional Constraints.

The trial court determined in this matter that the easement identified in Conatser
was rooted in Article XVII. (R. 0758). As shown, however, neither the public ownership
of water nor the “corollary” right to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable
streams are inherent in either the Constitution or the historical jurisprudence. The “right”
arose for the first time as a product of statute with the Conatser decision in 2008 and, as
such, is subject to modification or amendment by the legislature.
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The Conatser Court made clear that it was engaged in statutory construction and
interpretation; it was not engaged in constitutional analysis. Conatser reads:
By statute, “all waters in this state, whether above or underground, are
hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing
rights to the use thereof.” Under this doctrine of “public ownership,” the
public owns state waters and has an “easement over the water regardless of
who owns the water bed beneath.” In granting the public this easement,
“state policy recognizes an interest of the public in the use of state waters
for recreational purposes.”
Conatser, 2008 UT at ¶ 8 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (Supp. 2007) (emphasis
added)). The Court was engaged in an analysis of a statute that conferred public
ownership. It recognized that this statute, not natural law or the Constitution, granted the
public a recreational easement. It cited to Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1. It did not cite to or
interpret the Constitution. It did not cite to “natural law.”
The statute – Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 – declared public ownership and
adjudicated the scope of private ownership of beds and the rights associated therewith.
This is a legislative responsibility and a legislative prerogative. The legislature and not
the Constitution, having given birth to these concepts is free to restrict or broaden them as
it sees fit. As a result, there was no basis for the trial court to go any further and to do so
was error.
IV.

THE CONATSER EASEMENT IS NOT A RESOURCE SUBJECT TO
PUBLIC TRUST EVALUATION.
The public trust doctrine nominally and in both state and federal jurisprudence

applies only to public resources. Indeed, USAC enumerates the public resources to which
the trust has applied in Utah, to wit – sovereign and other lands acquired by the State,
school trust lands, public waters, and the ecological integrity of public lands and their
public recreational uses. (Opposition at p. 34). Conspicuously absent from this list is the
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cultivate their land; (2) post their land; (3) or request that people leave their
property. Utah Code Ann. § 73-29-102; 73-29-201.
· The Act does not require that private property owners prevent anglers from
using their property. Fly anglers may fish on private property with
permission. Utah Code Ann. § 73-29-201.
· The Act did not alter access points to water. Private property before the Act
remains private property after the Act and is subject to and protected by the
same trespass laws regardless of where it falls on the timeline. And just as
before the passage of the Act, anglers could not cut across private property
to access a stream, absent landowner permission, this remains the case after
the passage of the Act as well. See id.; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6206).
· Finally, the Act had no appreciable effect on flat-water recreation. (R.
2536).
All in all, the Act did not alter the vast majority of public uses. In fact, and as truly
at issue here, the only substantive effect was to enable landowners to exclude the public
from touching a portion of the beds of the streams and rivers of the State. Even this,
however, is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that the Act substantially impaired
the public’s interest in the lands and waters remaining.
B.

USAC Failed to Meet Its Burden to Prove Substantial Impairment of
the Public’s Interest in the Lands and Waters Remaining.
1.

The Trial Court’s Reliance on Mileage of “Fishable” Streams Was
Error.

USAC attempts to obscure the trial court’s error by contending that the trial court
based its finding of substantial impairment on something more than just the mileage of
fishable streams. (Opposition at p. 57). But in reaching its end result, the trial court
showed its math, so to speak. The trial court’s ruling was based solely on the numbers.
The trial court acknowledged that the sole question before it at trial was whether
the Act substantially impaired the public’s interest in the lands and waters that remain
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after passage of the Act. The trial court considered, and rejected, USAC’s argument on
crowding as an embodiment of substantial impairment. (R. 2650) The trial court then
considered USAC’s argument, “in the alternative … that the public’s interest in the lands
and waters remaining is substantially impaired by the Act’s sweeping closure of more
than 2,700 miles of Utah's rivers and streams to almost all public recreational use. In
other words, the Act results in substantial impairment by virtue of its scope.” (Id.).
Plainly stated, the trial court based its finding of substantial impairment solely on the
numbers. (R. 2659) (“Here, the Act closed more than 43% of Utah’s fishable rivers and
streams to almost all public recreational use. This expansive disposition impairs the
public’s interest in the waters remaining, because what remains is so drastically
diminished.”).
The trial court’s conclusion that the Act substantially impairs the public’s interest
in the lands and waters that remain, based solely on the impact of miles on which to
recreate, suffers from a number of errors.16 The trial court’s finding that what remains is
“drastically diminished” is a numerical finding. (Id.). The court’s logic is that “what
remains” is reduced in size by the Act’s closure of 43% of Utah’s fishable streams. But
error pervades that logic. What was “diminished” is the whole, not the remainder. That
is, what’s left after the whole was diminished by 43% is, by definition, what remains.
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Several of these errors are enumerated in VRA’s opening brief and are not rehashed
here, including: “(1) the trial court failed to examine the impairment of the lands and
waters “remaining”; (2) the proper scope of any quantitative inquiry must have
considered more than “fishable miles” of streams and rivers; (3) the trial court grounded
its conclusion on unreliable numbers and resolved doubts against rather than in favor of
constitutionality; and (4) the trial court’s analysis misconstrued the question presented by
limiting its inquiry to a quantitative assessment of fishing rather than a qualitative
assessment of recreation.” (VRA Brief at pp. 40-41).
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Consequently, this part of the trial court’s decision does not at all address the impairment
of what remains.
Moreover, the numbers do not demonstrate substantial impairment of the public’s
interest in the lands and waters remaining after the Act as required by Illinois Central and
its progeny. In its own words and in the first iteration of its holding, the trial court stated
“the Act closed more than 43% of Utah's rivers and streams to almost all public
recreational use.” (R. 2659). Upon USAC’s Motion to Amend, the trial court corrected
this statement to read: “the Act closed more than 43% of Utah’s fishable rivers and
streams to almost all public recreational use.” (emphasis added) (R. 4854). But this error
– initially concluding that the Act closed 43% of rivers and streams and then revising it to
43% of fishable rivers and streams, which is a greatly reduced total – highlights the
cracks in the trial court’s analysis.
The trial court improperly focused solely on fishable rivers and streams. (R. 2659).
That is, the trial court did not look at the impact, or lack thereof, of the Act on rivers and
streams that do not contain fisheries. The trial court did not look at the impact of the Act
on flat waters. The trial court did not look at the impact of the Act, or lack thereof, of the
Act on hunters, bird watchers, waders, swimmers or any other recreators other than
anglers and boaters. This nearsightedness renders the trial court’s ultimate conclusion of
substantial impairment erroneous and unsustainable.
Whether under the trial court’s newly minted test or under the widely-adopted
Illinois Central test, in the event of a disposition (or a statute tantamount to a
disposition), the court must examine whether the state action was accomplished “without
substantial impairment of the public’s interest in the lands and waters remaining.” (R.
1111); see also Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453. Stated otherwise, the trial court’s
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analysis required it to look at the impact on what remains, not what was impacted. The
court must examine not the property disposed of, but what is left of the public’s interest
after a disposition.
Here, as noted, the trial court did not look at what remained, but rather what it
perceived to be lost. And it perceived the loss as “fishable miles.” (R. 2659; 4854). As a
result, the court necessarily limited its analysis to anglers who prefer to fly fish and prefer
to do so on rivers and streams.17 The trial court heard testimony from a very small
segment of Utah’s population – indeed, the minority opinion even in the angling
population – and extrapolated the impact on this small segment to the rest of Utah’s
recreators in order to reach its ultimate conclusion. (R. 2622–2628).
Instead, the trial court should have focused on all of the available water-based
recreational opportunities that exist, both on rivers and streams and also on flat waters,
with and without fish. And the trial court should have concluded that because it received
no evidence as to any impact on any recreator, besides anglers, on any body of water,
besides fishable rivers and streams, that the Act did not substantially impair the public’s
interest on the lands and waters that remain.18
Perhaps understanding the task at hand but facing a dearth of evidence, the trial
court extended its conclusion to recreators who were not represented and upon whom the
impact of the Act is unknown. That is, the trial court made findings about the impact of

17

The trial court can hardly take the blame for this limited focus as USAC presented
evidence on only this narrow use of a very narrow slice of Utah’s waters during trial. (See
generally R. 2876–4542).
18
And even the testimony as to fishing opportunities for this small subset of the angling
population demonstrates that ample places for their desired angling experience – fly
fishing on a river with only a few people – continues to exist (R. 1629; 1636–1640;
1948–1959; 3586–3589; 3605–3607; 3611–3612; 3262–3263) (see also Tr. Exh. 9, pp.
91–92; Tr. Exh. 10.1, pp. 93–135).
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the Act on fishable rivers and streams and then concluded that this substantially impaired
all recreators – such as hunters, birdwatchers, waders and swimmers – who can recreate
on all waters, both flat and moving, regardless of whether they are fishable. In the trial
court’s own words, the Act closed “43% of Utah’s fishable rivers and stream miles to
nearly all fishing, and to all hunting, swimming, bird-watching, and any other
recreational activity utilizing the water.” (R. 2654–55; 4854). And, setting aside VRA’s
disagreement of the numbers, while this statement is otherwise technically sound, it is a
meaningless metric. There is no evidence as the impact on a swimmer, who can swim on
flat water, moving water, and water with and without fish, of the closure of streams with
fisheries. There are an estimated 85,916 miles of rivers and streams in Utah, not to
mention hundreds to thousands of square miles of flat water.19 Limiting the analysis to
the approximately 6,219 miles that have been deemed “fishable” rivers and streams and
looking at the impact of the Act just on these waters misconstrues the question presented
and assumes that all other recreators can only recreate on moving water that contain
fisheries.
2.

USAC’s Claims of Overcrowding Are Insufficient to Find a
Violation of the Public Trust.

To offend the public trust doctrine, the Act, itself, must substantially impair the
public’s interest in the lands and waters that remain. (R. 2646); Illinois Central, 146 U.S.
at 453. That is, there is a causation element. The substantial impairment must be due to
the challenged statute. Here, the trial court rightfully concluded that the evidence of
crowding was insufficient to find substantial impairment and, in any event, crowding
could not be tied to the statute itself. (R. 2650 “On the question of crowding, the

19

See The Montana Watercourse, http://mtwatercourse.org/waterfacts.htm.
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Coalition has failed to meet its burden of proof.”) Nevertheless, and without appealing
the correctness of this conclusion, USAC argues now to the contrary.
USAC scolds VRA for failing to marshal (“i.e. ignor[ing]”) evidence related to
crowding. (Opposition at p. 60). VRA submits that it suffered no obligation to marshal
such evidence because VRA is not challenging the trial court’s holding with respect to
crowding. The trial court found that substantial impairment in the form of crowding was
not caused by the Act because of, among other things, intervening factors such as
population growth. (R. 2650). That is, to the extent this Court now considers the evidence
USAC sets forth of crowding, it must also take into account the evidence the trial court
relied upon that negated USAC’s crowding argument.
In particular, at VRA’s request during trial, the trial court took judicial notice of
the census information. Between 2000 and 2010, Utah’s population grew from 2,233,198
to 2,763,885. See https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-46.pdf; see also (R. 2457–
2459; 4342).This growth of over half a million people represents a 23.8% increase in
Utah’s population. (R. 2640). This census information also shows incredible population
growth in the areas where VRA pinpoints the most desirable angling – Central and
Northern Utah. From 1990 to 2010, the population of Salt Lake County increased from
725,956 to 1,029,655, the population of Summit County increased from 15,518 to 36,324,
the population of Utah County increased from 263,590 to 516,564 and the population of
Wasatch County increased from 10,089 to 23,530. (R. 2457–2459) (citing
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-46.pdf ). As such, the trial court properly
found that it could not attribute crowding to the Act when growth in population is just as
likely a causative factor.
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Likewise, in dismissing the crowding argument, the trial court found that
comparisons between angling in Utah and angling in Idaho and Montana carried no
water. As explained by USAC’s witnesses, Idaho and Montana over 26,000 and 21,000
miles of fishable rivers and streams, respectively, whereas Utah has a purported 6,400
fishable miles. (R. 1472; 4299; Tr. Exh. 14). And Idaho and Montana have an estimated
447,000 and 267,000 licensed anglers, respectively, whereas Utah has an estimated
414,000 licensed anglers (Id.; see also R. 4105–4109). In other words, there is just more
water per licensed angler in Idaho and Montana than there is in Utah. The differences in
angling experiences between Utah and Idaho and Montana are a function of geography
and population, and not the existence of the Act.
The trial court properly found that the Act did not substantially impair the public’s
interest in the lands and waters that remain vis-a-vis crowding. Instead, dismissing the
crowding argument for lack of proof of causation, the trial court based its substantial
impairment holding solely on the numbers. The evidence that the Act caused the
purported crowding proves inadequate to find otherwise.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein as well as in VRA’s opening brief, the brief of
amicus, and the briefs of the State, VRA respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
trial court’s judgment and direct entry of judgment in favor of VRA. VRA further
requests an award of costs incurred on appeal.
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HEARING
This is the time set for oral arguments regarding motions pending at this time.
Mr. Coburn address the Court and presents arguments on behalf of Utah Stream Access
Coalition motion for summary judgment and responds to Court's questions.
Mr. Roberts address the Court and presents arguments on behalf of intervenor State of
Utah for motion for summary judgment and responds to Court's questions.
Mr. Lee address the Court and presents arguments on behalf of ATC for motion for cross
motion for summary judgment and responds to Court's questions.
Mr. Zimmerman address the Court and presents arguments and responds to Court's
questions.
11:35 Mr. Coburn presents closing arguments.
Mr. Roberts presents closing arguments.
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Case No: 100500558 Date:
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______________________________________________________________________________________
Mr. Lee presents closing arguments.
Parties rest.
Court will take matter under advisement and render a written decision.
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1

depth that you can go into it, you know.

2

you're going into it on the scientific side and thinking about

3

the--the entomology and learning that more and more in depth,

4

or whether or not you want to hone the skill of your cast or

5

whether or not you're sitting at, before you even leave it go

6

to the river, whether you've sitting at your desk at home and

7

on a vice to try to tie up a pattern to mimic one of these

8

insects before you go out.

9

facets and so much depth to this activity that I don't know in

10

I mean, whether

I mean, there are so--so many

my life if I ever will--

11

Q

Arrive?

12

A

--arrive.

13

Q

Yeah.

I've made it, I'm a fly fisherman now.

Why don't you describe for the Court if you

14

would what your preferred fly fishing experience is--well,

15

before we go there, let me ask you this, you've mentioned that

16

you can't experience on flat water what you can experience fly

17

fishing on a stream or a river.
Are there things that you can experience on flat

18
19

water that you don't get and maybe don't want on--on a river

20

or anywhere when you're fly fishing?

21

A

Yeah.

Unfortunately with some of the flat waters

22

that I go to or that, you know, that I've been to, there are

23

things that I'd prefer not to have.

24

find some bait or trash and things like that that I prefer not

25

be up there.

Unfortunately, I usually

There's a lot more traffic, boating traffic, for
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1

example, you know.

2

Q

Such as?

3

A

Such as boating traffic?

4

Q

What kind of boating traffic are we talking about?

5

A

Motor boats, for example, water skis,--

6

Q

Jet skis?

7

A

Jet skis.

You know, if you--if you--Jordanelle's a

8

perfect example of this.

I mean, I--it has--it has some

9

decent fishing in it but if you're trying to fish and angle

10

off the bank and somebody's coming blazing by at 50 miles an

11

hour kicking up a wake, you know, while you're trying to

12

pursue fish, that's--that's not something that I--that's not a

13

situation I prefer.

14

Q

Do you ever float tube at--you know what--what's a

15

float tube?

16

A

So a float tube--a float tube--

17

Q

Kick boat, either one.

18

A

Yeah.

Why don't you explain that first?

A float tube or a kick boat, these are--these

19

are non-motorized water craft, they are propelled by you or in

20

the--if you're taking them down a stream by the flow of the

21

current.

22

small, usually just enough room for you and your rod and maybe

23

some flies and then some kick fins on your feet to move you

24

around, maybe some oars if you're in a nicer pontoon boat.

25

Q

And yeah, they're in inflatable water craft, very

Okay.

But in the float tube, you're laying--legs
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1

are dangling down into the water--

2

A

They are.

3

Q

--quite a bit more than in a kick boat?

4

A

They are.

5

Q

Okay.

6

A

And generally, you're up on a platform above the

7
8
9
10

water in a kick boat.
Q

Have you ever used a kick boat or a float tube on

flat water where there were boats, motorboats?
A

Yeah.

And it's--it's actually kinda scary on a

11

very--very large piece of water or very busy piece of water

12

because you're in a very small craft and you're not

13

necessarily the most visible and somebody that's not paying

14

attention really--you--you run the risk of getting ran over,

15

certainly.

16

Q

And even--and even if you don't get run over, you--

17

A

If you don't get run over, you're constantly dealing

18

with wakes and--and in a small boat or a small float tube, you

19

don't want to capsize.

20

why I usually don't end up fishing that water.

21
22
23
24
25

Q

You know, all these things add up to

What about the noises that you're going to encounter

on flat water?
A

The noise from the boats, the smell of gas and

exhaust.
Q

Okay.
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1

A

Yeah.

2

Q

So let me go back to the question I was going to ask

3

you before we started talking about jet skis and that--and the

4

like.

5

preferred angling experience is on a river or stream, not your

6

ideal experience, but your preferred experience.

7

kind of experience would give you satisfaction when you came

8

off the water and headed back to the real world?

9

A

I would like you to describe for the Court what your

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Yeah.

What--what

Well, the first--the

10

first part of the preferred experience, I would say, would be

11

getting to a spot where I can have a little bit of a sense of

12

exploration, a little bit of an adventure, so you--that

13

generally means have some open water it move around and to be

14

able to hunt and pursue trout as I--as I described before.
The other part of that--of that experience of having

15
16

an area to move around in is generally that there's not a lot

17

of people there.

18

solitude, I don't have to be alone, sometimes I'll go fishing

19

with some buddies of mine, but amongst us, we do prefer--do

20

prefer solitude when we're out in the wilderness, to feel like

21

we are in the wilderness, like we're interacting with nature.
And then generally, it's nice to have a reasonable

22
23
24
25

It doesn't necessarily have to be total

shot at catching a fish.
Q

You have--well, let me ask you, have you been on

waters where there have been other anglers besides your
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1

buddies and you, where you've had--still had a preferred

2

angling experience?

3

A

Yeah.

I have.

I have.

4

Q

Okay.

And what it, even though you--there were

5

other anglers there, what was it about those experiences that

6

you came away feeling good about your trip?

7

A

One example that I can think of right now is, I was

8

actually on the Henry's Fork in Idaho where there's typically-

9

-you're not going to be the only person there, but there is a

10

decent enough code of etiquette that--and a game that people

11

know how to play that even if there are people there, they're

12

still basically fishing to a fish.

You're--

13

Q

You alone--

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

--are fishing to that fish?

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Okay.

18

A

Not fishing down on--on--not fishing on top of each

What is the etiquette you speak of?

19

other, crowding each other out, moving, you know, high--

20

there's the phrase of high holing, for example, as you move

21

and progress throughout a run and you move upstream, perhaps,

22

if you're targeting one or multiple fish, somebody's standing

23

right on top of you and basically, effectively prohibiting

24

your motion upstream, so you would have to jump out and

25

disrupt your--your experience and find the next available
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spot.
Q

2

So if I understand your testimony, you're fishing to

3

a fish or a run from below and somebody comes in at the top of

4

the run and comes down on you and fishes down on that same

5

run?

6
7
8
9

Is that what I'm hearing?
A

That is, yeah, that would be the definition of high

holing, being high holed.
Q

Right.

And you had a good or preferred fishing

experiences on waters like that in Utah where you've had--

10

you've had other anglers on the water but you've been able to

11

accommodate each other and have a--a good experience?

12

A

In the past.

13

Q

Well, let's talk about those in the past.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

In the past.
What do

you mean by the past?
A

I would--I would say around five, six years ago,

pre--pre H.B. 141.
Q

And where did you have those types of experiences

or that experience?
A

I had that experience on, I remember in particular

on the Middle Provo.

I've had--

21

Q

And where is the Middle Provo?

22

A

The Middle Provo is between Jordanelle Reservoir and

23
24
25

Deer Creek Reservoir.
Q

I'm going to show you what's been marked and

stipulated as being admitted Exhibit 3.1.

If you could--
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A

Yeah.

2

Q

--if you could, just point out for the Court where

3
4

the Middle Provo is?
A

So here's Jordanelle Reservoir right here, Deer

5

Creek right there and the Middle Provo flows from Jordanelle

6

down here.

7

Q

Okay.

(Inaudible)

And you said you had one or more

8

experiences where you were dealing with other anglers, where

9

there were other anglers fishing the water, but you were still

10

able back prior to H.B. 141 to have a good fishing experience?

11

A

Yeah.

12

Q

And how did you go about having a good fishing

13
14

Yeah.

I was.

experience if there were other anglers there?
A

Well, I was able to move away from them, for one, I

15

mean, I'm a relatively young guy, able guy and so I can go for

16

a walk, I had more time available at that time, too, to be

17

able to go for a walk.

18

at that time, that was more--more akin to what I was looking

19

for in my angling experience in that period of my development

20

as an angler.

21
22
23

Q

And--and what the Middle Provo offered

Do you ever leap frog fishing runs or holes while

you're fishing a stream?
A

Sometimes you have to, but it's not really preferred

24

etiquette because then if somebody jumps right in in front of

25

you and then you do the same thing back to them, you just end
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2

up in a cycle of deep frogging reciprocity and-Q

When you're on the Middle Provo, for example, are

3

there any distractions down there other than perhaps other

4

anglers and wildlife, the natural experience?

5

highway, for example?

6

A

On the Middle?

7

Q

Right.

8

A

No.

9

Is there a

I mean, there--there is a highway but it's a

ways away, it's not right up against the river.

10

Q

And so you don't hear it?

11

A

No.

12

Q

Okay.

13

A

There are some houses that are now popping up, but

14

they don't generally detract from the experience.

15

Q

Okay.

So when do you go fishing?

16

A

When I have time.

17

Q

Has that changed over time?

18

A

The amount of time I have to go fishing?

19

Q

Yes.

20

A

Yes, it has.

21

Q

Because?

22

A

Now, I mean, I have--from when--when I was able to

23

go fish in my younger days, now, I mean, I have more demands,

24

academic demands, I have a wife, I have family, life generally

25

more busy.
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Q

Okay.

2

A

So time is more limited.

3

Q

But before you had these other obligations or

4

privileges, however you might view them, were you able to go

5

further, if you will, to find a place to fish or go more often

6

or--

7

A

I was able to go more often.

You know, I would

8

generally say that even when--even in--and I'm thinking in

9

the--in this pre-H.B. 141 era, when notably, I was fishing

10

more than I am right now, I wouldn't necessarily have to go

11

further.

12

seems that now--now my time is limited for other, various

13

reasons.

14

Q

I could still use the same amount of time, it just

And--and am I to understand that you can't find the

15

experience you once had on the Middle Provo, by example, now

16

that you used to previously?

17
18

A

No.

I--I've rarely if ever fished the Middle Provo

anymore.

19

Q

Okay.

20

A

I think I've fished the Middle Provo once in the

21
22
23

past year versus a dozen or a couple dozen times.
Q

Let's talk for a few minutes about Stream Access

and in particular, about H.B. 141.

24

A

Okay.

25

Q

You're president of the Stream Access Coalition,
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have been for a couple years and have been a member for--for

2

five years.

3

A

That's correct.

4

Q

Are you familiar with H.B. 141?

5

A

I am familiar with H.B. 141.

6

Q

And what is your understanding of what H.B. 141

7
8

does?
A

It restricts the public's ability to recreate on

9

waterways, on rivers and streams where they flow over private

10

property unless you have express written landowner permission

11

or you are floating through.

12
13

Q

Okay.

You could also be able to fish that type of

water if there--it was walk-in access of old; is that right?

14

A

That's correct.

15

Q

Or an easement or something like that?

16

A

That's correct.

17

Q

Okay.

18
19

MR. THOMAS:
Leading.

20
21
22

Objection on that one, your Honor.

THE COURT:
Q

Sustained.

(By Mr. Coburn)

Are you familiar with walk-in

access?

23

A

I am familiar with walk-in access.

24

Q

And what is your understanding of walk-in access?

25

A

That it is a negotiated agreement between the State

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188

2960

August 26, 2015

Utah Stream Access Coalition v. Victory Ranch, LC

Trail
Page 86
1

and private property owners that allow access across their

2

property to the streambed on their property that they may join

3

in or opt out of as they please.

4
5

Q

So by virtue of the walk-in access agreement, you're

allowed to fish waters that traverse private beds?

6

MR. THOMAS:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. THOMAS:

9

Foundation, your Honor.
Where is the foundation lacking?
I don't know how he knows all of these

things about walk-in access agreement, whether he's ever seen

10

one, whether he's executed one, whether he's been party to

11

one, yet, he's testifying as to the content and as to the

12

legal merits of the agreement.

13

THE COURT:

14

Lay additional foundation.

15
16

Q

Sustained.

(By Mr. Coburn)

Have you ever fished walk-in

access?

17

A

Many times.

18

Q

Okay.

19

A

Predominantly on the Weber River between Rockport

20
21

Where?

and Echo.
Q

Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit 3.3.

22

Would you point out for the Court the walk-in access section

23

of the Weber River that you've just told the Court that you've

24

fished.

25

A

The specific?
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1

Q

Or no, the--the stretch--

2

A

Or the reach of the river.

3

Q

The reach of the river.

4

A

All right.

So here's--here's Wanship, here's

5

Rockport Reservoir that I mentioned and then--and then it

6

flows goes down to Coalville, and Echo's down here.

7

Q

Okay.

(Inaudible)

8

A

Right here through here.

9

Q

Okay.

And I noticed the coloring on this particular

10

map, you see part of that stretch is red, there's a little

11

piece of yellow and some of it's magenta.

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Okay.

14

And what's the magenta, I mean, at least

according to this map?

15

A

Secured access on private land.

16

Q

And what is your understanding of what that means,

17

having fished walk-in access areas between the Provo and

18

Wanship?

19
20

A

That that is likely walk-in access on--in that

stretch.

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

It does.

23

Q

Floating of waters that traverse private beds?

24

A

Yes.

25

You mentioned H.B. 141 allows floating.

As long as you don't stop or impede your

downstream progress.
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1

Q

Can you touch the bed?

2

A

That's not my understanding.

4

Q

For any reason?

5

A

Well, unless you need to safely portage around an

3

6
7

You cannot touch the

bed.

obstacle, for example, then you can touch the bed.
Q

Okay.

Are you familiar with Utah's trespass laws?

8

And let me--let me preface that question with, you do

9

understand that H.B. 141 talks about private property as to

10

which access is restricted; correct?

11

A

Correct.

12

Q

Okay.

13
14

What's your understanding of Utah's trespass

laws in that context?
A

That if you access a river, one of these H.B. 141

15

waters that traverse private property and you touch the beds,

16

that you are subject to Utah's trespass laws.

17
18

Q

Okay.

Do you have an understanding of the phrase

private property as to which access is restricted?

19

A

Yes.

I do.

20

Q

And what is that understanding?

21

A

My understanding would be, I mean, the most obvious

22

example would be if there is a fence around private property

23

that says private property, no trespassing, then that's

24

private property to which access is restricted.

25

there's other parts of the law that discuss cultivated lands

But then

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188

2963

August 26, 2015

Utah Stream Access Coalition v. Victory Ranch, LC

Trail
Page 89
1

and I apologize, I don't remember the exact wording, but land

2

that looks like it could be cultivated or land that looks like

3

it is designed to keep people out.

4

Q

Land that's designed?

5

A

Excuse me, a fence, fenced property that looks like

6

that it is--the access is restricted or it is fenced then to

7

keep people out or keep livestock in.

8

Q

Okay.

9

A

I generally err on the side that property,

10

especially in this region of the State, is private, unless I

11

specifically know otherwise.

12

Q

And how might you know specifically otherwise?

13

A

If, say, for example, I've crossed the Forest

14

Service boundary.

15

Q

Okay.

16

A

Or I know that I'm on public land, I--I know from

17

looking up this specific area that I'm going in advance,

18

perhaps, that it's public property where I'm going.

19

Q

Okay.

20

A

Or I've crossed the walk-in access ladders and know

21
22
23

that it's still private property but I'm-Q

Have you ever sought and secured landowner

permission to fish a stream on that individual's property?

24

A

Yes.

I have.

25

Q

And where--where was that?
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1

A

2

Reservoir.

3

Q

4
5

That was on the Upper Weber up above Rockport

Let's go back to that exhibit and can you point out

where that is?
A

Again, we're looking at Exhibit 3.3.

Okay.

So we see the Weber River as its course

6

right here, here's where I was discussing the walk-in access

7

before and the Weber's flowing in this direction, so upstream

8

of Wanship, upstream of Rockport is this region of the Weber

9

right here and it goes up towards Kamas and Peoa.

10
11
12

And that's

where I've secured--had secured access.
Q

You say you had secured access there.

First of all,

who's the landowner?

13

A

A gentleman has the name of Lloyd Marchant.

14

Q

Okay.

15

A

I believe is the principal of the school up there

16
17
18
19

and a very nice man.
Q

Okay.

And he allowed you to access the Weber and

his section of the Weber there from his property?
A

He did.

He let us park on the road there and then

20

cross his property to access the river and then once we were

21

in the river, move upstream or downstream.

22

Q

And what time period are we talking about?

23

A

We are talking about the Conatser window, this 2008-

24

2009, pre-May 2010, and then a little while thereafter, he

25

would allow me to fish the stretch of river that he actually
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1

had--that actually crossed his property.

But unfortunately,

2

due to some family disputes, he was no longer able to allow me

3

to access that stretch of river.

4

Q

Okay.

5

A

He lost that property.

6

Q

--it was private property as to what access--as to

7

It--

which access was restricted?

8

A

That's correct.

9

Q

Okay.

10

A

I wish I had.

11

Q

Why?

12

A

That's exceptionally good trout fishing.

So you haven't been back there since?

And it's

13

exactly the reason why--I mean, it falls in line with all the

14

reasons why I fly fish; the solitude, the experience, the

15

wildlife, the river, the fish, the character of the river and

16

stream.

17

Q

The type of angling that I can do there.
Okay.

Let me--let me explore a little bit more of

18

this notion that H.B. 141 allows floating.

19

your understanding of what that means to you.

20

and I know you've heard this in the debates over the years,

21

well, you can still float and fish these waters; correct?

22

You've heard that?

23

A

I've heard that.

24

Q

Right.

25

A

That's an absurd notion.

You're smiling.

And you explained
And there's--

Why are you smiling?
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Why?

1
2

A

So, I have floated and fished many times in the

3

past, we mentioned the Green River--or you mentioned the Green

4

River where that's actual--actually possible to do.

5

requires a certain depth to the river, it requires a certain

6

flow to the river.

7

use to do that, your feet are typically dangling below the

8

water as we--we talked about drifts and being able to present

9

the fly in a way that is natural and convincing for the fish.

It

And in these water craft that you would

10

And if you--you can't use oars, obviously, because you're

11

casting at the same time, so the only way to control your

12

speed downstream is by kicking with your fins.
And with the exception of the Green River, I can't

13
14

think of another river in the State where it is possible to do

15

that and angle at the same time.

16

Q

For trout?

17

A

For trout.

18

Q

So--

19

A

And then there's an additional problem, once you

Right.

Yes.

20

actually hook into a--a trout, you can't stop to land the

21

trout and while it's feasible on the Green where you're--you

22

are able to kick and you know, stay away from obstacles, it's

23

sufficiently wide and deep, et cetera, in some of these small

24

streams, even if you were to be able to float down them, to be

25

able to fight and land a fish is going to be practically
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1

impossible.

2

Q

So where--what--what waters are you familiar with

3

other than the Green River where float fishing as allowed

4

theoretically by H.B. 141 would be practically impossible?

5
6

A

Let--let me just, so I hear you correctly, where

float fishing is practically impossible under--

7

Q

Under--

8

A

Within the confines on H.B. 141?

9

Q

Yeah.

10
11

On the rivers that you're familiar with, what

rivers are you talking about?
A

I'm talking about the Upper Weber, I'm talking

12

about the Middle Weber, those two stretches that I just

13

mentioned, I'm talking about the Upper Provo, which flows

14

through Victory Ranch.

15

most familiar with.

Those are the--the examples that I'm

16

Q

And what about the Middle Provo?

17

A

You--I mean, I guess you could float the Middle

18

Provo, but--but that's impractical, for a number of other

19

reasons, not including the fact that you'll have--you have so

20

many people that you'll be floating through.

21
22

Q

Well, you can float the--the Middle Provo,

theoretically, and fish at the same time because it's public.

23

A

You could.

24

Q

Okay.

25

So let's talk about the Provo River a little

more.
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THE COURT:

1
2

break?

It's five to 12:00.

3

MR. COBURN:

4

THE COURT:

5
6

Counsel, would now be a good time to

It's fine with me, I'm-If we're moving on to a different topic

or-MR. COBURN:

I am.

I'm going to start getting into

7

the meat of these witness' testimony and just for the

8

edification of both yourself and counsel, I don't intend to go

9

through in detail with the subsequent witnesses all the

10

nuances of the sport and the love of the sport, but I wanted

11

the Court to get a feel for that.

12

THE COURT:

Okay.

13

MR. COBURN:

So--

14

THE COURT:

Great.

I--I'm just asking the question,

15

I'm not suggesting we need to break now, but if it's a good

16

time, we can.

17

MR. COBURN:

This is a good time, your Honor.

18

THE COURT:

19

Court's in recess.

20

(Recess)

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

We'll go back on the record in the

22

matter of Utah Stream Access vs. VR Acquisitions, the parties

23

are present.

24

Mr. Olson, if you'd re-take the witness stand.

25

THE WITNESS:

Thank you, your Honor.
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1

THE COURT:

Counsel, you may proceed.

2

MR. COBURN:

Thank you, your Honor.

3

Q

(By Mr. Coburn)

Mr. Olson, before we broke for

4

lunch, we were just starting to explore the Provo River a

5

little more and you mentioned this morning that you had fished

6

the Provo River; correct?

7

A

That's correct.

8

Q

And I believe you mentioned specifically the middle

9

section of the Provo between Jordanelle and Deer Creek.

10

A

That's correct.

11

Q

Okay.

12

the Provo?

13

A

14
15

Have you--have you fished other sections of

I have.

I have fished the Upper Provo and the Lower

Provo sections both.
Q

Okay.
MR. COBURN:

16

Your Honor, I--I realized when I got

17

out of here that I had never asked you for permission to

18

approach the witness.

19

Permission to approach.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. COBURN:

22

THE COURT:

23

Q

You're good.
Thank you, your Honor.
Thank you.

(By Mr. Coburn)

Would you point out for Judge

24

Pullan where the lower section of the Provo is that you've

25

fished?
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1
2

A

So the lower section of the Provo flows out of

Deer Creek Reservoir right here.

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

And eventually makes its way down into Orem, into

5

Provo and terminates in Utah Lake, but the section where most

6

of the fishing happens is--is this upper reach and the canyon

7

below Timpanogos.

8
9
10

MR. THOMAS:

Your Honor, may I just inquire, when

they have the map app, would you have an objection to us
coming up and--

11

THE COURT:

12

THE WITNESS:

13

Yeah.

Come on up so everyone can see.

Would you like me to go through that

again?

14

THE COURT:

Yeah.

15

THE CLERK:

And talk just a little bit louder when

16

One more--one more time.

you're aware from the mike.

17

THE COURT:

Okay.

18

THE WITNESS:

Okay.

So the Lower Provo that we're

19

talking about right here flows out of Deer Creek Reservoir,

20

down through the canyon, past Mt. Timpanogos here, into Orem

21

and down into Utah Lake and the region that we're focusing on

22

where I've done the most angling is in this stretch from Mt.

23

Timpanogos up to Deer Creek.

24
25

THE COURT:
Q

Okay.

(By Mr. Coburn)_

And what about the--do you fish
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1
2

the Upper Provo exclusive of Victory Ranch for now?
A

The only place that I have fished the Upper Provo

3

exclusive of Victory Ranch is--is up very high on Forest

4

Service land and I would have a difficult time pointing out

5

exactly where that is up on the map, probably somewhere up

6

here, I would--I would guess.

7

Q

Okay.

And where, since we have this map up here so

8

the Judge can identify, where is the Victory Ranch section of

9

the Upper Provo?

10

A

So the Victory Ranch section of the Upper Provo,

11

you'll see, I'll just kinda walk you upstream from the

12

Jordanelle Reservoir, your Honor, okay, so you have this

13

little yellow section right here that is Rockport State Park

14

and then it crosses--or actually, I should say before it hits

15

the bridge with State Road 32, it becomes Victory Ranch and

16

then Victory Ranch is the next four or so miles upstream from

17

there.

18

Q

19

So generally in this area.
Thank you.

So let's talk about the Lower Provo.

You say you have fished the Lower Provo?

20

A

I have.

21

Q

You fished it prior to 2--May, 2010?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

And how many times?

24

A

Only a couple of times prior to May, 2010.

25

Q

And do you recall as you sit here, what year or

I have.
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1

years those were?

2

A

3

fished it.

4

Q

Okay.

5

A

Yeah.

6

Q

And the next time you fished it prior to May, 2010,

7

I want to say 2009 would be the first time I

would that have also been in 2009?

8

A

That also would have been in 2009.

9

Q

Okay.

Is there anything about either of those

10

occasions fishing the Lower Provo that stands out in your

11

mind?

12

A

Yeah.

I mean, it's--pardon me, it's the general

13

things that I think about the Lower Provo right now that's

14

somewhat inconsistent with my preferred fishing experience.

15

There's a highway right there, it's generally loud, road

16

noise, there's a lot of--a lot of signs warning and making

17

various suggestions about private property and whether you

18

will or will not be fined by fishing in certain areas.
The first time I fished it, I remember it was in

19
20

summer and there was a large amount of tubers, inner tube--

21

inner tubers floating down the river on various--their inner

22

tubes or inflatable mattresses or what have you, so it wasn't

23

the most conducive to an enjoyable fishing experience for me.

24
25

Q

Just as a general proposition, how wide is the

Provo in this section, the Lower Provo in this section between
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1
2

Deer Creek and Timpanogos?
A

Oh, you know, I wouldn't say--I wouldn't say it's

3

much wider than maybe from where you're standing to those back

4

row of windows.

It's--it's relatively narrow in that stretch.

5

Q

6

an average?

7

A

I would say that's fair, yeah.

8

Q

Okay.

9
10

And it gets narrower or wider in spots, but that's

And so how did the--the presence of the

tubers, were they quiet and respectful as they came through?
A

Some--well, they all wanted to know, they're all

11

very interested in knowing how the fishing had been as they

12

float over, but you can imagine standing where you are, Mr.

13

Coburn, and--and making a cast, you know, with a nine-foot

14

long rod and a 30-foot long cast that at this point, you're

15

already covering a large swath of the river so it makes it--

16

makes it very difficult to effectively fish with lots of inner

17

tubes coming through or waves of inner tubes coming through.
So your two experiences prior to May, 2010, fishing

18
19

on the Lower Provo, at least this one was, didn't meet

20

expectations or at least what you hoped for in terms of a

21

preferred angling experience?

22
23

A

That's correct.

This one didn't.

And the other experience, I remember going back

24

later in the fall and it was very--I will give it this, it was

25

very beautiful with the colors on Mt. Timpanogos, and I
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1

remember low clouds and--and it was very pretty.

Less tubers

2

that time, but again, you know, the--the road noise, the

3

traffic, those things were detracting from the experience and

4

the presence of signs of--

5

Q

Okay.

What about other anglers?

6

A

There were quite a few, number of other anglers.

7

Actually, I was relatively inexperienced fishing the Lower

8

Provo and that's one of the ways that I knew where I could go

9

or where an access was, was the presence of cars pulled off on

10

the side of the road; but unfortunately, when I get packed

11

down there to the river, there was a good number of anglers

12

down there fishing as well.

13

Q

Were you able to find a run or runs to fish?

14

A

I think I might have found one, but nothing

15

remarkably stands out that is really--I don't have a good, I

16

don't have a memory of the Lower Provo in general that draws

17

me to come back to that spot.

18
19

Q

Okay.

Did you fish the Lower Provo after May 20th,

2010?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

On how many occasions?

22
23
24
25

That would be from May,

2010, to today?
A

Again, I would say I--I bet I can count it on--

count them on both hands.
Q

Okay.

So--
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1

A

So six times, maybe.

2

Q

Okay.

3

A

I'd say.

4

Q

Do any of those particular experiences on the

5

Middle Provo--strike that, the Lower Provo, following May,

6

2010, stand out in your mind?

7

A

Unfortunately for the same reasons as before,

8

there's times when I've gone there and I had--I have had one

9

good day fishing that I recall right now, that was--I believe

10

in March, a couple years back.

11

fishing, small, little mayflies on the surface; but again,

12

there was--I was--I remember going there and being surprised

13

because I was there about the noon hour which is when this

14

hatch typically happens and surprised at how many people I saw

15

on the river.

16

partner I was fishing with, something to the effect of, don't

17

these people have jobs, or something like that.

18

was--I was really surprised how many people were there in the

19

middle of the day.

20

Q

And it was--it was decent

I think I probably made a comment to the

Because I

You've mentioned that unfortunately some of your

21

other experiences, other than the one that you just spoke to

22

on the Lower Provo compare somewhat to the ones you had prior

23

to May, 2010.

Is that the tubers you're referring to or--

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Anything else?
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1

A

They--I mean, there were people prior to May, 2010,

2

there seemed to be more crowding after that point.

The

3

quality of the fish, that seemed--what seemed somewhat

4

similar.

5

I mean, the thing--the thing that becomes difficult with going

6

down and fishing some of these areas when there is signage all

7

over the place about, you may or may not be trespassing and

8

this sort of thing, is it makes me very nervous and uneasy as

9

a angler and a law-abiding citizen whether or not I even want

There was definitely--seems to be more--more signs.

10

to go there.

11

doesn't make for a very good angling experience, certainly not

12

a preferred angling experience.

13
14
15

Q

And when I start adding all these things up, it

You mentioned quality of fish.

of the fish was about the same.
A

You said the quality

Did I hear you correctly?

Between before May, 2010, and on the two occasions

16

that I fished there, I--I didn't do particularly well, but I

17

do remember the fish that I caught seemed--

18

Q

Okay.

19

A

But that's a very small sample size, I should say.

20

Q

But--but I want to make sure the record is clear

21

here.

22

fish after May, 2010, versus before May, 2010?

23
24
25

Did you testify in--with regards to the quality of the

A

With the quality of the fish that were actually

there-Q

Right.
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1

A

--in the river?

2

Q

Right.

3

A

For that, again, very small sample size that I'd

4

seen, the--it seemed--they seemed somewhat similar; but again,

5

I mean, we're talking two, three fish before May, 2010.

6
7
8
9

Q

Okay.

How would you compare your experience angling

on the Lower Provo prior to May, 2010, to after May, 2010?
A

Again, none of the times really were that great of

an angling experience for me.

You know, the--perhaps--yeah, I

10

would just say that none--none of those angling experiences

11

particularly stand out in my head as a particularly fulfilling

12

or--or angling experience that drives me to go back.

13
14
15

Q

What about the number of anglers that you saw prior

to May, 2010, versus after May, 2010?
A

There's definitely more after May, 2010.

And I'm

16

thinking particularly of a--of a stretch of the Provo--of the

17

Upper Provo--or sorry, excuse me, the Lower Provo River on the

18

upper section of the Lower Provo River, which then, I know

19

used to receive a fair bit of angling pressure and did not

20

anymore and I think that's because it had something to do with

21

the no trespassing signs that were posted all around it.

22

Q

Okay.

How would you compare it--well, let--let me

23

ask this first for foundation purposes:

24

time you fished the Lower Provo?

25

A

Successfully fished?

When was the last

Or attempted to fish the Lower
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1

Provo?

2

Q

Well, let's talk about successfully fished, first?

3

A

The last time I successfully fished the Lower

4
5
6
7

Provo would have been that occasion a couple years ago.
Q

And what do you mean by successfully fished at

that--on that occasion?
A

I got--arrived at the river, the flows looked good,

8

the weather looked favorable, donned the waders, went down,

9

encountered a hatch, made casts, caught fish.

10

Q

Okay.

11

previously?

12

A

But again, there were more anglers than

Yes.

13

MR. THOMAS:

14

THE COURT:

15

Q

Objection.

Leading.

Sustained.

(By Mr. Coburn)

Then you mentioned--you asked me

16

whether I meant successfully fished the Lower Provo or

17

attempted to fish the Lower Provo.

18

attempted to fish the Lower Provo?

19

A

What did you mean by

The--actually the most recent time I went to the

20

Lower Provo, I arrived there to find that the flows were low,

21

the wind was fierce and there were still some people that were

22

going out and fishing but it was not something that I

23

preferred to do at that point.

24
25

Q

So am I to understand, is the Court to understand

that the last time you successfully fished the Lower Provo was
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1

2013?

2
3
4

A

I think that is accurate.

Q

Okay.

I would say March, 2013,

yes.
Did you notice any change in the Lower Provo

5

and--and your fishing experience between May, 2010, and March,

6

2013?

7

A

Every time, again, as I mentioned, that there is--

8

apart from the issue of--of tubers, it is a very heavily used

9

river.

And while that bar is already set for high use, I

10

would say in that time period, each time that I would go

11

there, I would see more people.

12

is a trend, that it is increasing in--in use.

13

Q

Okay.

I think that that is a--that

And did that include in March, 2013?

‘Cause

14

you--I'm assuming that March, 2013, there weren't any real

15

brave tubers?

16

A

There were not brave tubers in March, 2013, no, but

17

there were people and I think what ended up allowing me to

18

have that--that decent angling experience that I described is,

19

although there were people above and below me, I happened to

20

be in the right spot at the right time and lucked into it, I

21

guess.

22

Q

Okay.

Now, let's talk about the Middle Provo,

23

which is between Deer Creek and Jordanelle.

24

the Middle Provo prior to May, 2010?

25

A

Had you fished

Yes.
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1

anglers at the Henry's Fork in Idaho; is that correct?

2

A

That is--that is correct.

3

Q

And the difference was better etiquette of the

4
5

anglers; correct?
A

There's a number of differences between the Middle

6

Provo and the Henry's Fork in Idaho.

7

differences.

8

Q

9
10

Vast, vast number of

What you testified to earlier was that it was the

etiquette of the anglers who won't skip ahead and take holes
or jump downstream from you; correct?

11

A

That was part of the testimony.

12

Q

Okay.

13

A

I would say that--

14

Q

So you might have a better time on the Middle Provo

15
16

if people behaved better?
A

I also might have a better time on the Middle Provo

17

if it had large rainbow trout that appreciated eating dry

18

flies and was a very wide, slow meandering river.

19

Q

Okay.

You talked about part of your experience

20

fishing on the Lower Provo that you don't enjoy is the tubers;

21

correct?

22

A

I--I do not particularly enjoy--I do enjoy tubing

23

but I do not enjoy being floated over while I'm trying to fly

24

fish.

25

Q

And you testified that part of the reason you don't
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1

enjoy flat water is because of the boats and the wakes and the

2

other motorized vehicles that are on the water; is that

3

correct?

4
5

8
9
10
11

Those are some of the reasons that I testified to,

Q

And because of the bait.

A

I was referring to trash left behind, not

yes.

6
7

A

you?

necessarily bait itself.
Q

But the bait fisherman is enjoying the water;

correct?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Recreating on the water.

14

You said that, didn't

And the boater is

recreating on the water; right?

15

A

That is correct.

16

Q

And the tubers are recreating on the water.

17

A

They are.

18

Q

Okay.

I believe you testified with respect to the

19

Middle Strawberry that before H.B. 141, you fished there on

20

approximately two occasions; is that correct?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

And since H.B. 141, you've fished there 20 to 25

23

times; is that correct?

24

A

Yes.

That's correct.

25

Q

So despite the fact that you find it a less
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1

enjoyable experience, you continue to go back and in fact,

2

have gone back significantly more times?

3

A

I am limited with places where I can go.

4

Q

And those two occasions out of the 25 occasions that

5

you've been up there, you haven't had a good time on two of

6

those occasions?
You've been up there 25 times since Conatser.

7
8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Have you had two good experiences in those 25

10

occasions?

11

A

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

since I've been up there.
Q

But using your--comparing the 25 times you've been

up now to the two times you were up there before; correct?
A

What I am comparing are not two distinct points.

I'm comparing a trend.
Q

And on the Lower Provo, you testified that you

fished there twice before Conatser; correct?
A

That's correct.
And you fished there six times after Conatser;

20
21

I've had two good experiences in those 25 occasions

correct?

22

A

That's--yes.

23

Q

And you've--on the Middle Provo, you testified that

24

you fished there ten times before and you testi--and fished

25

there 50 times since; is that correct?
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MR. COBURN:

I'm going to object to that.

2

that's misstating the witness' testimony.

3

off points were with H.B. 141, not Conatser.

4
5

MR. THOMAS:

I'm sorry.

I think

I think those cut-

He's right.

He's correct.

I'm--I--

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. THOMAS:

Sustained.
That would be correct.

8

Q

(By Mr. Thomas)

With respect--

9

A

I was with you.

10

Q

We--we understand each other.

11

So on the Lower Provo, you testified that you

12

fished there twice before H.B. 141 and six times after.

13

A

That's correct.

14

Q

With respect to the Middle Provo, you testified

15

that you fished there ten times before and 50 times after?

16

A

Roughly speaking with those numbers, yes.

17

Q

And with Strawberry below Starvation, I believe

18

we've already talked about that.

19

A

Yes.

We haven.

20

Q

Weber, between Wanship and Coalville, I believe you

21

said before 2010, you fished there once and pos-2010, you

22

fished there 20 to 30 times?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

And Rockport to Echo on the Weber, before 2010, you

25

fished there one to two times and after, you fished 50 times;
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1

is that correct?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Okay.

4

Rockport to Echo, we'll go low, 20 on Wanship to Coalville-A

5
6

So that means post-2010, we have 50 times on

That's the same stretch of river.

The Weber,

Rockport to Echo and Wanship to Coalville.

7

Q

Okay.

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Okay.

10

A

Yeah.

11

Q

Seventy-five times, total.

12

the Middle?

13

A

Yeah.

14

Q

A hundred and twenty-five times?

15

A

Yeah.

16

Q

Now, on the Lower Provo, six times?

17

A

Yeah.

18

Q

So that would have been 131 times in the last five

19

years?

20

A

Yeah.

21

Q

A lot of fishing for someone who's in school, isn't

23

A

Well, I'll tell you, in five years, that spreads out

24

a lot.

And the other thing is, when you--a time going fishing

25

isn't necessarily a time.

22

So a total of 50 times there?

And then 20 to 25 times on Strawberry?

And then 50 times on

it?

You look at the days where you go
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1

to the Strawberry, for example, where it requires to take an

2

entire day versus comparing that to, say, the Middle Provo

3

where I could run up in an evening.

4
5

Q

Cedar City to get to Strawberry?

6

A

7

Three?

8

Q

9
10

Do you know how long it would take somebody from

I don't have the foggiest; five hours?

Four?

I--I don't know.
There are always some places you're not going to be

able to go because you can't access them; right?

Because

they--it's too snowy, for example?

11

A

Snowy does preclude access to some places.

12

Q

Some people aren't going to be able to access every

13

stretch of the river because they're not physically capable;

14

correct?

15

A

That is correct.

16

Q

And sometimes, anglers can't fish particular sets

17

of streams--parts of streams because they prefer bait fishing;

18

correct?

19

A

Certainly.

20

Q

You talked a lot about your preferred angling.

21

What

was the phrase you were using?

22

A

My preferred angling experience?

23

Q

Preferred angling experience.

24

I'd like to run through some of the factors on that.

25

Is it correct that your preferred angling experience
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1

would not involve tubers or boaters or bait trash lying

2

around?

3
4
5

A

Well, sometimes I will float on a boat and that's

part of my preferred angling experience, but-Q

That's not what you testified.

But you testified

6

that all those things would be factors in a preferred angling

7

experience, did you not?

8
9

A

I--I testified that those things detract from my

preferred angling experience.

10

Q

And not too many people; correct?

11

A

That's correct.

12

Q

And in fact, you want a place where somebody hasn't

13
14
15
16

been there in the last hour; correct?
A

Well, it depends on if I'm trying to catch a fish

right there or not.
Q

Well, I know, but didn't you--didn't you tell us

17

earlier that you want to make sure--you want to go places

18

where you can--people haven't been, to--what was the--what was

19

the phrase you used?

20

A

Put the fish down.

21

Q

Put the fish down.

22

A

It is--it is helpful for successful angling if

Right.

23

that's what you're going for, that you fish somewhere where

24

fish haven't been put down, yes.

25

Q

So what you, in an ideal world, would like is
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Q

Would you please explain those?

A

Sure.

When I started guiding and we would do a trip

on the Middle Provo in 2005, you could meet your client at
8:30, 8:00-8:30, build a good rapport with them, slowly drive
down the river, get into a parking lot that you wanted to
fish, get onto the river, start fishing, you could go from
hole to hole and fish different water.
Now, in--in this year, we usually meet our clients
at around 6:00, 6:30, we race to the river and we, you know,
get out in the parking lot, we try to hustle them to get to
the river and usually when we get on a spot to fish it, we do
not move.
Q

Why not?

A

If--if we moved, a lot of times, on a typical--

typical day on the Middle Provo, there's a good chance we're
not going to find another spot to fish.
Q

Did you say that was on what section of the Provo?

A

The middle, the middle section of the Provo.

Q

What about the Lower Provo?

A

The Lower Provo, we find the--the same thing, that

it--that it's difficult to move spots.

And I--I typically

don't guide as much on the Lower Provo in the summertime.
Q

Because?

A

In the past few years, the--the tubers that have

been floating down the river have kind of ruined what I
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Q

And that regulation change would have allowed bait

fishermen on the entire stretch of the Middle Provo?
A

Two miles--

Q

Okay.

A

--worth.

Q

Two miles.

A

‘Cause prior to that, it was not, it was artificial

fly and lure only.
Q

Okay.

Was there any opposition to that effort to

change those two miles to allow bait fishing?
A

There was some, yes.

Q

Where did that opposition come from?

A

From anglers, from angling organizations, just

people that have specific preferences for the type of fishing
that they want to do.
Q

What type of preferences?

A

Primarily fly fishing.

Q

So the--at least one segment of the fly fishing

community opposed allowing bait fishing on a two-mile stretch
of the Provo to conduct this study?
A

Correct.

There were some perceptions there that too

many fish would be removed or opportunities would be lost, et
cetera, et cetera.
Q

And the purpose of the study was to try and create

bigger fish?
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EXHIBIT D
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On appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Wasatch County,
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Additional Parties and Counsel on Reverse

own interpretation of the Utah Code and its prior precedent, not on the Utah
Constitution_ Ed. 11 8-19.
Following Conatser, the legislature chose to address the balance struck by
this court between legislatively grounded recreational user rights and landowner
rights to the private beds of non-navigable public waters. In choosing to define
legislatively the scope of the public right to use public waters recreationally, the
legislature noted a number of problems arising after Conatser, such as
"widespread unauthorized invasion of private property for recreation purposes."
Utah Code § 73-29-103(2). In its deliberations, the legislature considered itself to
be weighing the rights of the public in public waters, under Article XX, Section 1,
and the rights of owners of private beds underlying public waters not to have
their property "taken or damaged for public use without just compensation,"
under Article I, Section 22. Recognizing that the balancing of those rights is
difficult, the legislature judged HB 141 to be a reasonable compromise on a
"difficult, intricate, and emotional topic." Recording of Utah House Floor
Debates, FIB 141 First Substitute, 58th Leg., 2010 Gen. Sess. (Feb. 23, 2010)
(statement of Rep. Sheryl L. Allen). As the sponsor of the bill explained, he tried
"to draft something that truly would harmonize constitutional protections [of
private property] with trying to give as much access to the fishermen as we could
without violating those principles." Id. (statement of Rep. Kay L. McIff).

6

HB 141 is the first Utah statute to expressly recognize the public's right to
use waters recreationally. hi recognizing that right, HB 141 clarified that the
public's right to recreationally use waters that flow over private property does
not stein from that part of the Utah Code declaring public ownership of water,
i.e., the portion of the Code which was first enacted in 1903. Specifically, it states
that public ownership of water "does not create or recognize an easement for
public recreational use on private property." Utah Code & 73-1-1(2). Instead, the
scope of that recreational right is recognized and governed by Chapter 29 of Tide
73. Id. § 73-1-1(4).
HB 141 altered the scope of the right to use public waters struck by
Conatser. Id. § 73-29-103. HB 141 affirms the right to "touch" privately owned
beds under public waters to allow "safe passage and continued movement" or
"portage around a dangerous obstruction" while floating public waters. Id. § 7329-202(2). But it does not allow the public to remain on the privately owned beds
unless (1) the owner consents or (ii) the public has so used the particular bed for
at least 10 consecutive years after 1982. Id. § 73-29-201(2), -202(3), -203(1).
Otherwise, when property is fenced or posted as private, the public's recreational
use right does not include touching privately owned beds. Id. § 73-29-102(5).
The legitimacy of the legislature's concerns about the impact of Cottatser is
confirmed by evidence presented to the district court in this case. This evidence
included a number of declarations documenting problems with trespassers, cut

7

fences, and litter, as well as resulting dangers to the public.4 Randy Sessions, the
owner of property along the Weber River in Morgan County, had his fence,
which crosses the river, cut the Monday after the Conatser opinion was released.
(R.366). Larry Hays, the owner of residential property along the Millcreek stream
in Salt Lake City, experienced a surge of people fishing in his backyard after the
Conatser opinion was published. (12.375) Tim Simonsen, the owner of property
along the Provo River in Summit County, had his fences cut numerous times.
(R.371) As a result, his horses left the property and walked onto State Highway
35. (Id.) Additionally, due to cut fences, a neighbor's cows crossed onto
Simonsen's property and caused damage. (R.372) Randy James, the owner of
property on the Smith and Morehouse Creek in Summit County, dealt with
cleaning up trash and waste from trespassers who camped and started fires on
his property. (R. 368) James stated that the fence around his property is cut at
least once a year. (Id.)
The balance struck by HB 141 between the public right to the recreational
use of non-navigable public' waters with the rights of owners of the private beds
beneath them is a reasonable solution reached after careful consideration of
competing interests. The legislature has not given public property to private
property owners; it has simply chosen to strike a different balance than this court
did in Conatser in administering the public's property for the benefit of all.

4

These declarations are attached at Addendum B
8

EXHIBIT E

100-3-6— 100-3-10

WATER ANI) IRRIGATION

[1100]
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